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Misinformation Mayhem: 
Social Media Platforms’ Efforts to Combat Medical and Political Misinformation 
 
– Dawn Carla Nunziato1 
INTRODUCTION 
Social media platforms today are playing an ever-expanding role in shaping the 
contours of today’s information ecosystem.2 The events of recent months have driven home 
this development, as the platforms have shouldered the burden and attempted to rise to the 
challenge of ensuring that the public is informed – and not misinformed – about matters 
affecting our democratic institutions in the context of our elections, as well as about matters 
affecting our very health and lives in the context of the pandemic.  This Article examines 
the extensive role recently assumed by social media platforms in the marketplace of ideas 
in the online sphere, with an emphasis on their efforts to combat medical misinformation 
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as their efforts to combat false political 
speech in the 2020 election cycle. In the context of medical misinformation surrounding 
the COVID-19 pandemic, this Article analyzes the extensive measures undertaken by the 
major social media platforms to combat such misinformation. In the context of 
misinformation in the political sphere, this Article examines the distinctive problems 
brought about by the microtargeting of political speech and by false political ads on social 
media in recent years, and the measures undertaken by major social media companies to 
address such problems. In both contexts, this Article examines the extent to which such 
measures are compatible with First Amendment substantive and procedural values. 
 
Social media platforms are essentially attempting to address today’s serious 
problems alone, in the absence of federal or state regulation or guidance in the United 
States.  Despite the major problems caused by Russian interference in our 2016 elections, 
the U.S. has failed to enact regulations prohibiting false or misleading political advertising 
on social media – whether originating from foreign sources or domestic ones – because of 
First Amendment, legislative, and political impediments to such regulation.  And the 
federal government has failed miserably in its efforts to combat COVID-19 or the medical 
 
1 William Wallace Kirkpatrick Research Professor and Professor of Law, The George 
Washington University Law School; Co-Director, Global Internet Freedom Project. I am 
extremely grateful to Nathaniel Christiansen, Chris Frascella, Conor Kelly, and Ken 
Rodriguez for providing excellent research and library assistance in connection with this 
article, to Kierre Hannon for excellent administrative assistance, and to Associate Dean 
for Research and Faculty Development Thomas Colby and Interim Dean Chris Bracey for 
academic and financial support of my research.  
2 See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598 (2018). 
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misinformation that has contributed to the spread of the virus in the U.S. All of this 
essentially leaves us (in the United States, at least) solely in the hands, and at the mercy, 
of the platforms themselves, to regulate our information ecosystem (or not), as they see fit.   
 
The dire problems brought about by medical and political misinformation online in 
recent months and years have ushered in a sea change in the platforms’ attitudes and 
approaches toward regulating content online.  In recent months, for example, Twitter has 
evolved from being the non-interventionist “free speech wing of the free speech party”3 to 
designing and operating an immense operation for regulating speech on its platform –
epitomized by its recent removal4 and labeling5 of President Donald Trump’s (and Donald 
Trump, Jr.’s) misleading tweets.  Facebook for its part has evolved from being a notorious 
haven for fake news in the 2016 election cycle6 to standing up an extensive global network 
of independent fact-checkers to remove and label millions of posts on its platform – 
including by removing a post from President Trump’s campaign account, as well as by 
labeling 90 million such posts in March and April 2020, involving false or misleading 
medical information in the context of the pandemic. Google for its part has abandoned its 
hands-off approach to its search algorithm results and has committed to removing false 
political content in the context of the 2020 election7 and to serving up prominent 
information by trusted health authorities in response to COVID-19 related searches on its 
platforms.8   
 
These approaches undertaken by the major social media platforms are generally 
consistent with First Amendment values, both the substantive values in terms of what 
constitutes protected and unprotected speech, and the procedural values, in terms of process 
accorded to users whose speech is restricted or otherwise subject to action by the platforms. 
As I discuss below, the platforms have removed speech that is likely to lead to imminent 
harm and have generally been more aggressive in responding to medical misinformation 
 
3 See e.g., Marvin Ammori, The 'New' New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the 
Age of Google and Twitter, 127 Harv. L. Rev 2259 (2014); Josh Halliday, Twitter’s Tony 
Wang: ‘We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech Party', THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 
22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-tony-wang-free-
speech. 
4 See Arjun Kharpal, Twitter Removes an Image Tweeted by Trump for Violating Its 
Copyright Policy, CNBC (Jul. 2, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/02/twitter-
removes-trump-image-in-tweet-for-violating-copyright-policy.html. 
5 See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Trump Lashes Out at Social Media Companies After Twitter 
Labels Tweets with Fact Checks, WASH. POST (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/27/trump-twitter-label/. 
6 See text accompanying notes x  - y. 
7 See text accompanying notes x  - y. 
8 See text accompanying notes x  - y. 
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than political misinformation. This approach tracks First Amendment substantive values, 
which accord lesser protection for false and misleading claims regarding medical 
information than for false and misleading political claims. The platforms’ approaches 
generally adhere to First Amendment procedural values as well, including by specifying 
precise and narrow categories of what speech is prohibited, providing clear notice to 
speakers who violate their rules regarding speech, applying their rules consistently, and 
according an opportunity for affected speakers to appeal adverse decisions regarding their 
content. 
 
While the major social media platforms’ intervention in the online marketplace of 
ideas is not without its problems and not without its critics, this Article contends that this 
trend is by and large a salutary development – and one that is welcomed by the vast 
majority of Americans9 and that has brought about measurable improvements in the online 
information ecosystem.10 Recent surveys and studies show that such efforts are welcomed 
by Americans11 and are moderately effective in reducing the spread of misinformation and 
in improving the accuracy of beliefs of members of the public.12  In the absence of effective 
regulatory measures in the United States to combat medical and political misinformation 
online,13 social media companies should be encouraged to continue to experiment with 
 
9 See text accompanying notes x  - y. 
10 See text accompanying notes x  - y. 
11 See text accompanying notes x  - y. 
12 See text accompanying notes x  - y. 
13 The United States government’s hands-off approach to combating misinformation on 
social media stands in stark contrast to the aggressive approach undertaken by the 
European Union. The European Commission in 2018 adopted an aggressive Action Plan 
against Disinformation as part of the Commission’s continued attempt to crack down on 
fake news. See Roadmaps to Implement the Code of Practice on Disinformation, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jul. 7, 2020) , https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/roadmaps-implement-code-practice-disinformation. The Action Plan 
focuses on improving detection of disinformation; implements a coordinated alert system 
among E.U. institutions and member states to enable them to better respond to 
disinformation in real time; and calls for the adoption of a self-regulatory Code of 
Practice on Disinformation. Several major social media platforms have now signed on to 
the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, including Facebook, Google, Twitter, 
Microsoft, and, most recently, TikTok. The E.U. Code of Practice on Disinformation 
seeks to ensure transparency in political advertising, the removal of fake accounts, 
identifying non-human interactions, cooperating with fact-checkers to detect 
disinformation, and promoting fact-checked content. Each of the platforms that have 
signed on to the Code presented detailed plans setting forth the tools that it commits to 
deploy against disinformation on its platform. See Code of Practice on Disinformation 
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developing and deploying even more effective measures to combat such misinformation, 
consistent with our First Amendment substantive and procedural values. 
 
I.  Platforms’ Efforts to Address Medical Misinformation in the Context of the Pandemic  
 
 In recent months, arguably the most important challenge for social media platforms 
has been responding to the rampant spread of medical misinformation in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. With a significant portion of the global community under some kind 
of lockdown order (one third of the global population, by one estimate14), Internet 
connectivity – and Internet content – are playing a more significant societal role than ever. 
In contrast to their previous hands-off position, the major platforms have risen to the 
challenge and have taken decisive action in response to medical misinformation in the 
context of the pandemic. The predominant focus across platforms has been on the curbing 
of false information, especially that which tends to encourage the spread of imminently 
harmful information about the virus. The platforms’ actions taken in response to COVID-
19-related medical misinformation have generally been more aggressive than their 
response to misinformation in the political arena, which is consistent with First 
Amendment substantive values that accord lesser protection for false and misleading 
statements of fact than for false and misleading political claims (as I discuss below).  And 
 
One Year On: Online Platforms Submit Self-Assessment Reports, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_6166.  
See Facebook’s commitment and roadmap for implementation:  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54789; 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54788;  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62681;  
Twitter’s commitment and roadmap for implementation: 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/search.html?q=disinformation; 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54784; 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54780; 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62682;  
Google/YouTube’s commitment and roadmap for 
implementation: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54785  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54781  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62680; and  
TikTok’s commitment and roadmap for implementation: 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=68231  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=68231  
14 Juliana Kaplan, Lauren Frias and Morgan Mcfall-Johnson, Our Ongoing List of How 
Countries Are Reopening And Which Ones Remain Under Lockdown, BUS. INSIDER, 
available at https://www.businessinsider.com/countries-on-lockdown-coronavirus-italy-
2020-3?r=DE&IR=T (last accessed July 21, 2020).  
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the platforms’ actions in the context of medical misinformation generally track First 
Amendment substantive values by prohibiting false and imminently harmful information. 
In general, the platforms have undertaken extensive measures to remove imminently 
harmful false medical information (e.g., posts that advocate drinking bleach to cure 
COVID-19), while taking less severe measures – including labeling/countering with 
counter-speech, and/or reducing the reach of, less harmful or misleading medical 
information (e.g., posts that tout conspiracy theories claiming that Dr. Anthony Fauci 
created the virus).  Although the platforms’ efforts thus far are commendable, what is 
needed at this point is for them to act much more quickly to remove harmful false and 
misleading medical misinformation before it goes viral, as I discuss below.   
 
Facebook’s Response to Medical Misinformation 
 
 Facebook has responded to the rampant spread of misinformation on its platform 
in the context of the pandemic by: removing harmful false/misleading posts related to 
COVID-19 – including, recently, posts by President Trump; labeling other, less harmful 
posts; and issuing strong warnings to those who have shared or reacted to such posts. In 
addition, Facebook has made prominently available its Coronavirus Information Center, a 
repository of curated, expert information about the virus.  
 
Facebook’s current COVID-19 misinformation policy as follows: 
We remove COVID-19 related misinformation that could contribute to imminent 
physical harm. We’ve removed harmful misinformation since 2018, including false 
information about the measles in Samoa where it could have furthered an outbreak 
and rumors about the polio vaccine in Pakistan where it risked harm to health aid 
workers. Since January [2020], we’ve applied this policy to misinformation about 
COVID-19 to remove posts that make false claims about cures, treatments, the 
availability of essential services or the location and severity of the outbreak. We 
regularly update the claims that we remove based on guidance from the WHO and 
other health authorities. For example, we recently started removing claims that 
physical distancing doesn’t help prevent the spread of the coronavirus. We’ve also 
banned ads and commerce listings that imply a product guarantees a cure or 
prevents people from contracting COVID-19. … For claims that don’t directly 
result in physical harm, like conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus, we 
continue to work with our network of over 55 fact-checking partners covering over 
45 languages to debunk these claims…. Once a post is rated false by a fact-checker, 
we reduce its distribution so fewer people see it, and we show strong warning labels 
and notifications to people who still come across it, try to share it or already have.15 
 
15 https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/combating-covid-19-misinformation/ 
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In a surprising move in August 2020, Facebook implemented its COVID-19 
misinformation policy to delete a post from President Trump’s campaign account, in which 
Trump can be heard to say on video, in the context of re-opening schools, that children are 
“almost immune” to the coronavirus.16 While Facebook does not frequently remove 
medical misinformation, its Community Standards allow for removal of misinformation 
that contributes to the risk of physical harm or imminent violence. In response to guidance 
from external experts, including the World Health Organization and local health 
authorities, Facebook now requires the removal of false claims about: the existence or 
severity of COVID-19, how to prevent COVID-19, how COVID-19 is transmitted 
(including false claims that certain racial groups are immune to the virus), cures for 
COVID-19, and access to or the availability of essential services.17   
 
 Facebook has broadened its work with certified independent fact-checking 
organizations18 as part of its effort to curb the spread of medical misinformation, adding 
eight new dedicated fact-checking partners and “expanding [its] coverage to more than a 
dozen new countries.”19 Facebook’s approach to medical misinformation generally focuses 
less on removing false content and more on reducing the distribution of medical 
misinformation once one of its independent fact-checking partners has rated it as false.20 
To the everyday user, Facebook’s approach takes the form of warning displays on posts 
 
16 Heather Kelly, Facebook, Twitter Penalize Trump for Posts Containing Coronavirus 
Misinformation, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/05/trump-post-removed-facebook/ 
17 See Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit – Final Report, July 8, 2020. 
18 "To reduce the spread of misinformation and provide more reliable information to 
users, we partner with independent third-party fact-checkers globally who are certified 
through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)." Partnering with 
Third-Party Fact-Checkers, Facebook: Journalism Project (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-
checking/selecting-partners (last accessed July 21, 2020). IFCN verified signatories: 
Verified Signatories of the IFCN Code of Principles, 
https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories  
(last accessed July 21, 2020). 
19 Guy Rosen, An Update on Our Work to Keep People Informed and Limit 
Misinformation About COVID-19, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/COVID-19-misinfo-update/. Facebook has also 
expanded the program to Instagram and now boasts “more than 60 fact-checking partners 
covering more than 50 languages around the world." Guy Rosen, Investments to Fight 
Polarization, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 27, 2020), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/investments-to-fight-polarization/.  
20 Guy Rosen, An Update on Our Work to Keep People Informed and Limit 
Misinformation About COVID-19, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/COVID-19-misinfo-update/.  
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that have been deemed false, with Facebook issuing 40 million such warnings in March 
2020 and 50 million in April 2020.21 Facebook claims that when people see such warning 
labels, “95% of the time they did not go on to view the original content.”22  In addition, in 
response to the pandemic, Facebook has revised its content reviewer guidance to make 
clear that claims such as that people of certain races or religions have the virus, created the 
virus, or are spreading the virus violate Facebook’s hate speech policies.23  
 
As part of its general counterspeech approach – of presenting users with accurate 
information in response to false and misleading information, as opposed to by censoring 
false information – Facebook has also taken the step of reaching out to users who have 
interacted with (i.e., reacted to or commented on) medical misinformation related to 
COVID-19 and connecting those users with responses to common “myths” about COVID-
19 that have been identified and addressed by the World Health Organization and inviting 
these users to share the link with others.24 See notice below. 
 
 
 
The most common of the myths shared on Facebook tend to suggest ineffective or 
potentially harmful remedies for COVID-19, such as drinking bleach or disinfectant, or 
taking unproven and potentially harmful drugs such as hydroxychloroquine.25 Other myths 
 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Coronavirus Disease Advice for the Public: Mythbusters, World Health Organization, 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-
public/myth-busters (last accessed July 21, 2020). 
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commonly seen on the platform are those claiming that measures scientifically proven to 
contain the spread of the virus – such as social distancing – are ineffective.26  
 
In attempting to combat medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic, 
Facebook has also stood up its Coronavirus Information Center.27 This feature, which 
Facebook initially placed prominently at the top of the News Feed (so that it was 
immediately visible upon opening the platform) serves as a rolling collection of relevant 
updates about the pandemic as this information became available from both national and 
global health authorities.28  
 
Facebook’s approach to combating medical misinformation on its platform29 is 
heading in the right direction but is plagued by unacceptable delays. A comprehensive 
 
26 Some recent research has highlighted the parallels in the sharing of disinformation in 
the current pandemic with the dissemination of information on supposed “cures” via 
newspapers during the 1918 flu pandemic. As Elizabeth Zetland, a researcher at 
MyHeritage, puts it, “You were meant to cook 12 onions, get the juice and drink it the 
day afterwards, and that would protect you from the flu.” See Suyin Haynes, ‘You Must 
Wash Properly.’ Newspaper Ads From the 1918 Flu Pandemic Show Some Things Never 
Change, TIME (Mar. 27, 2020), available at https://time.com/5810695/spanish-flu-
pandemic-coronavirus-ads/. Newspapers were quick to urge individuals to wear or make 
their own masks; the Red Cross, in an ad placed in the Daily Gazette of Berkeley, 
California, called anyone not wearing a mask “a dangerous slacker.” See id.   
27  https://about.fb.com/news/2020/07/coronavirus 
28 Kang-Xing Jin, “Launching the Coronavirus Information Center on Facebook”, 
Keeping People Safe and Informed About the Coronavirus, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(updated July 16, 2020) https://about.fb.com/news/2020/07/coronavirus/#coronavirus-
info-center. 
29 Facebook’s approach to combating medical misinformation also encompasses its 
response to protests involving stay-at-home measures that authorities have deemed 
necessary to curb the spread of the pandemic. Thus far, the company’s response to such 
protests has been inconsistent. Facebook has removed posts organizing anti-stay-at-home 
protests in California, New Jersey, and Nebraska after determining - in consultation with 
state officials - that the protests violated the states’ social distancing rules. Donie 
O’Sullivan and Brian Fung, Facebook Will Take Down Some, But Not All, Posts 
Promoting Anti-Stay-at-Home Protests, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics/facebook-COVID-shutdown-
protests/index.html. In Pennsylvania, however, an anti-lockdown group with more than 
66,000 members promoted a lockdown protest scheduled to take place in Harrisburg, 
without any action from Facebook. Id.  Facebook’s efforts in this area are sporadic and 
appear to lack a coherent strategy. In New Jersey, for example, state officials had not 
specifically requested that Facebook take down content promoting anti-lockdown events, 
but Facebook staff had been “communicating about the issue” with the governor’s staff. 
Id. In Nebraska, Facebook contacted the governor’s office “to learn more about 
Nebraska’s social distancing restrictions, and the governor’s staff provided already 
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study undertaken by the human rights group Avaaz examined the dissemination of over 
100 pieces of misinformation content about the virus that were rated false and/or 
misleading by independent fact-checkers and that could cause public harm.30 Avaaz’s 
review found that “millions of the platform’s users are still being put at risk,” and that “the 
pieces of [false and/or misleading] content [sampled by Avaaz] were shared over 1.7 
million times on Facebook, and viewed an estimated 117 million times.31 For example, 
according to Avaaz, “a harmful misinformation post that claimed that one way to rid the 
body of the virus is to … gargle with water, salt or vinegar was shared over 31,000 times 
before eventually being taken down after Avaaz flagged this content for action by 
Facebook.”32Avaaz found that, notwithstanding Facebook’s policy described above, 41 
percent of virus-related misinformation content remains on the platform without warning 
labels, including 65% of content that had been flagged by Facebook’s own fact-checking 
program.33 Beyond failing to apply warning labels to content that its fact-checking partners 
deemed to be misleading, Facebook suffers from delays in the implementation of its 
policies. In this age of instant digital news, unless imminently harmful medical 
disinformation is rapidly curbed, it runs the risk of hastening the spread of the virus. And 
yet according to Avaaz, it “can take up to 22 days for the platform to downgrade [false 
and/or misleading content related to the virus] and issue warning labels.” The lag is even 
more severe in the case of non-English content, where “over half (51%) of non-English 
misinformation content had no warning labels.”34 Fortunately, Facebook seems willing to 
change course, as evidenced by its willingness to institute a retroactive alert system, 
whereby each user exposed to harmful misinformation will be notified and provided with 
 
publicly available information about Nebraska’s 10-person limit and directed health 
measures.” Id. Facebook is apparently reaching out to governments on these matters 
because “[u]nless government prohibits the event during this time, we allow it to be 
organized on Facebook.” Id. Yet, at least in the case of Nebraska, Facebook’s effort 
seems to be a somewhat fumbling one, with Facebook employees reaching out to state 
officials to learn about information that is already readily available. Facebook’s hesitance 
to remove posts related to protests likely stems from a deeper worry about becoming the 
online policeman on the question of the constitutional right to assemble. Id. 
30 How Facebook can Flatten the Curve of the Coronavirus Infodemic, Avaaz (Apr. 15, 
2020), https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/facebook_coronavirus_misinformation/. For 
the full text of the report, see 
https://avaazimages.avaaz.org/facebook_coronavirus_misinformation.pdf.  
31 Id.  
32 How Facebook can Flatten the Curve of the Coronavirus Infodemic, Avaaz (Apr. 15, 
2020). “2,611 clones” of the same false post “remain on the platform with over 92,246 
interactions. Most of these cloned posts have no warning labels from Facebook.” 
33 Id. (emphasis in original).  
34 Id.  
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accurate information. (Avaaz indicated that members of Facebook’s misinformation team 
made such a commitment in a conversation with Avaaz staff in April 2020.35)  
 
Facebook’s intent to combat medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic 
is commendable, but the failures in the timely implementation of its new policies are highly 
problematic given the degree of the public health risk. While Facebook cannot reasonably 
be expected to identify and curb every piece of misinformation on the pandemic on its 
platform, it must commit to staffing up and improving the implementation of its measures 
to counter medical misinformation. Facebook’s success rate in curbing harmful 
misinformation might never be perfect, but its present approach has glaring flaws that must 
be remedied.   
 
Twitter’s Response to Medical Misinformation  
 
 Twitter’s response to medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic – like 
its response to false political ads, as discussed below – has been more forceful than that 
undertaken by Facebook.  According to this response, Twitter will remove harmful posts 
containing medical misinformation that “could pose a threat to people’s health or well-
being,” will label other posts containing medical misinformation, and will also direct users 
to truthful and accurate information about the pandemic.   
 
Under a recent update to Twitter’s rules, tweets that cause harm (including in the 
context of the pandemic) will be removed.  Accordingly, Twitter will remove from its 
platform tweets along the lines of “social distancing is not effective” or “the news about 
washing hands is propaganda.”36 An important component of Twitter’s effort includes 
broadening its definition of harmful tweets, so as to more proactively target and remove 
content that expressly contradicts the most up-to-date guidance from authoritative health 
sources (such as the Center for Disease Control and the World Health Organization).37 
Relevant portions of Twitter’s currently applicable set of rules regarding its handling of 
pandemic-related misinformation is set out in the margin.38 
 
35 See supra note x.  
36 Jack Morse, Twitter Steps up Enforcement in the Face of Coronavirus Misinformation, 
MASHABLE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/twitter-cracks-down-
coronavirus-misinformation/.  
37 @vijaya and @Derelia (Vijaya Gadde and Matt Derella), An Update on Our Continuity 
Strategy During COVID-19, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-our-continuity-
strategy-during-COVID-19.html.  
38 Steps we’re taking 
... 
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Broadening our definition of harm to address content that goes directly against guidance 
from authoritative sources of global and local public health information. Rather than 
reports, we will enforce this in close coordination with trusted partners, including public 
health authorities and governments, and continue to use and consult with information 
from those sources when reviewing content. 
● We’ll continue to prioritize removing content when it has a clear call to action 
that could directly pose a risk to people’s health or well-being, but we want to 
make it clear that we will not be able to take enforcement action on every Tweet 
that contains incomplete or disputed information about COVID-19. This is not 
meant to limit good faith discussion or expressing hope about ongoing studies 
related to potential medical interventions that show promise. 
● … We will continue to use both technology and our teams to help us identify and 
stop spammy behavior and accounts. 
● We may also apply the public interest notice in cases where world leaders violate 
the COVID-19 guidelines. 
Under this guidance, we will require people to remove tweets that include: 
● Denial of global or local health authority recommendations to decrease someone’s 
likelihood of exposure to COVID-19 with the intent to influence people into 
acting against recommended guidance, such as: “social distancing is not 
effective”, or actively encouraging people to not socially distance themselves in 
areas known to be impacted by COVID-19 where such measures have been 
recommended by the relevant authorities. 
● Description of alleged cures for. COVID-19, which are not immediately harmful 
but are known to be ineffective, are not applicable to the COVID-19 context, or 
are being shared with the intent to mislead others, even if made in jest, such as 
“coronavirus is not heat-resistant - walking outside is enough to disinfect you” or 
“use aromatherapy and essential oils to cure COVID-19.” 
● Description of harmful treatments or protection measures which are known to be 
ineffective, do not apply to COVID-19, or are being shared out of context to 
mislead people, even if made in jest, such as “drinking bleach and ingesting 
colloidal silver will cure COVID-19.” 
● Denial of established scientific facts about transmission during the incubation 
period or transmission guidance from global and local health authorities, such as 
“COVID-19 does not infect children because we haven’t seen any cases of 
children being sick.” 
● Specific claims around COVID-19 information that intends to manipulate people 
into certain behavior for the gain of a third party with a call to action within the 
claim, such as “coronavirus is a fraud and not real - go out and patronize your 
local bar!!” or “the news about washing your hands is propaganda for soap 
companies, stop washing your hands”. 
● Specific and unverified claims that incite people to action and cause widespread 
panic, social unrest or large-scale disorder, such as “The National Guard just 
announced that no more shipments of food will be arriving for 2 months - run to 
the grocery store ASAP and buy everything!” 
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Twitter states that it is working with “trusted partners” (including public health 
authorities and governments) to both identify and remove harmful medical misinformation 
 
● Specific and unverified claims made by people impersonating a government or 
health official or organization such as a parody account of an Italian health 
official stating that the country’s quarantine is over. 
● Propagating false or misleading information around COVID-19 diagnostic criteria 
or procedures such as “if you can hold your breath for 10 seconds, you do not 
have coronavirus.” 
● False or misleading claims on how to differentiate between COVID-19 and a 
different disease, and if that information attempts to definitively diagnose 
someone, such as “if you have a wet cough, it’s not coronavirus - but a dry cough 
is” or “you’ll feel like you’re drowning in snot if you have coronavirus - it’s not a 
normal runny nose.” 
● Claims that specific groups, nationalities are never susceptible to COVID-19, 
such as “people with dark skin are immune to COVID-19 due to melanin 
production” or “reading the Quran will make an individual immune to COVID-
19.” 
● Claims that specific groups, nationalities are more susceptible to COVID-19, such 
as “avoid businesses owned by Chinese people as they are more likely to have 
COVID-19.” 
  
... 
Instituting a global content severity triage system so we are prioritizing the potential rule 
violations that present the biggest risk of harm and reducing the burden on people to 
report them. 
Executing daily quality assurance checks on our content enforcement processes to ensure 
we’re agile in responding to this rapidly evolving, global disease outbreak. 
Engaging with our partners around the world to ensure escalation paths remain open and 
urgent cases can be brought to our attention. 
Continuing to review the Twitter Rules in the context of COVID-19 and considering 
ways in which they may need to evolve to account for new behaviors. 
As we’ve said on many occasions, our approach to protecting the public conversation is 
never static. That’s particularly relevant in these unprecedented times. We intend to 
review our thinking daily and will ensure we’re sharing updates here on any new 
clarifications to our rules or major changes to how we’re enforcing them.  
Finally, we’re encouraged that our service is being used around the world to provide free, 
authoritative health information, and to ensure that everyone has access to the 
conversations they need to protect themselves and their families. For more, our dedicated 
COVID-19 Event page has the latest facts right at the top of your timeline. @vijaya and 
@Derelia (Vijaya Gadde and Matt Derella), An Update on Our Continuity Strategy 
During COVID-19, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-our-continuity-
strategy-during-COVID-19.html. 
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content.39 The range of content that Twitter states it will remove is broad. Twitter is focused 
on tweets that contain “denial of global or local health authority recommendations,” those 
that “describe alleged cures for COVID-19, which are not immediately harmful but are 
known to be ineffective,” those that “describe harmful treatments or protection measures 
which are known to be ineffective,” and those that “deny established scientific facts about 
transmission during the incubation period.”40  
 
Twitter is also targeting tweets that go beyond medical misinformation and appear 
to encourage societal unrest. For example, the company states that it will target and remove 
tweets that contain “specific and unverified claims that incite people to action and cause 
widespread panic, social unrest, or large-scale social disorder,” as well as tweets that 
contain “specific and unverified claims made by people impersonating a government or 
health official or organization,” such as a parody account of an Italian health official stating 
that the country’s quarantine is over.41  
 
In May 2020, Twitter announced a policy of placing warning labels on tweets 
containing misinformation related to COVID-19, including tweets that are issued by world 
leaders. According to Twitter’s head of site integrity Yoel Roth, such warning labels will 
apply to anyone sharing misleading information that meets the requirements of Twitter’s 
policy, and no exceptions will be made for the tweets of world leaders.42   
 
Pursuant to its policy of removing COVID-19 related medical misinformation, 
including from world leaders, in August 2020 Twitter removed a tweet from the Trump 
Campaign in which Trump claimed that children being “almost immune” to the virus. 
Twitter suspended the account’s tweeting privileges until the post was deleted, citing its 
rules on COVID-19.43 
 
In addition to removing and labeling tweets in its attempts to restrict false and 
misleading medical information in the context of the pandemic, Twitter is also pursuing 
other means, including by restricting the functionality of Twitter accounts that spread such 
information. For example, on July 28, Twitter penalized Donald Trump, Jr., for posting 
misinformation in the form of a Breitbart video showing a group of doctors making 
misleading and false claims about the COVID-19 pandemic. See below. In the video, a 
group of people dressed in white lab coats who call themselves “America’s Frontline 
Doctors” staged a press conference in front of the U.S. Supreme Court making claims such 
 
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Yoel Roth (@yoyoel), TWITTER (May 11, 2020, 3:10 PM), 
https://twitter.com/yoyoel/status/1259923758522855426.  
43 Kelly, supra note x. Facebook deleted the same post. Id. 
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as that hydroxychloroquine is “a cure for Covid” and “you don’t need a mask” to slow the 
spread of coronavirus.44 Twitter order Trump Jr. to delete this misleading tweet, added a 
note to its trending topics warning about the potential dangers of hydroxychloroquine, and 
in addition, took measures to limit Trump Jr.’s account functionality for 12 hours.45 
(Facebook and YouTube also removed the offending video, but not before it had been 
viewed millions of times.46)   
 
 
44 See Sam Shead, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube Pull ‘False’ Coronavirus Video After 
It Goes Viral, CNBC (July 28, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/28/facebook-
twitter-youtube-pull-false-coronavirus-video-after-it-goes-viral.html. 
45 See Rachel Lerman, Katie Shepherd, and Taylor Telford, Twitter Penalizes Donald 
Trump Jr. for Posting Hydroxychloroquine Misinformation Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, 
WASH. POST (July 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/28/trump-
coronavirus-misinformation-twitter/. 
46 See Shead, supra n. 45. 
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47 
 
In addition to implementing systems to remove false and misleading medical 
information, Twitter is also prominently making available truthful and accurate 
information about COVID-19 through its Know The Facts search prompt.  In early 2020, 
Twitter expanded its #KnowTheFacts program – which it had earlier put in place to help 
the public find credible information on immunization and vaccine health – to surface and 
highlight credible information on the virus and to ensure that when Twitter users access 
the platform to search for information about the virus, they are first met with credible, 
authoritative information from reliable sources. A further component of Twitter’s 
#KnowTheFacts program limits auto-suggest results that may direct Twitter users to 
 
47 Twitter Comms (@TwitterComms), TWITTER (July 28, 2020, 10:15 AM), 
https://twitter.com/TwitterComms/status/1288115957005578246. 
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misinformation on Twitter.48  And, similar to Facebook, Twitter has created a specific 
webpage dedicated to providing the latest authoritative information on the pandemic. This 
resource – Twitter’s “COVID-19 Event Page” – provides an aggregation of credible news 
updates on the pandemic, curated with content from verified sources like The New York 
Times, Associated Press, and Reuters, as well as other public health sources such as the 
Center for Disease Control, which provide relevant virus-related updates.49  
 
Twitter’s aggressive approach to medical misinformation on its platform appears 
to be effective, so far.  According to Twitter’s reporting on the implementation of its 
policies regarding medical misinformation in the context of the pandemic, it has removed 
thousands of tweets containing misleading and potentially harmful content and has 
challenged over 1.5 million accounts that were targeting discussions around COVID-19 
with spammy or manipulative behaviors.50  
 
Google/YouTube’s Response to Medical Misinformation 
 
Google’s approach to searches that seek information on COVID-19 is similarly 
proactive. Whereas the company has for most of its history deferred solely to its complex 
algorithms to serve up search results without human intervention, Google now has taken 
the approach of having searches related to coronavirus trigger a type of “SOS alert,” and 
 
48 See @Twitter, Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, TWITTER BLOG 
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/COVID-19.html, 
Launch of a new dedicated #KnowTheFacts search prompt: 
 
As the global conversation continues around the spread of COVID-19, we want to 
share the work we’re doing to surface the right information, to promote 
constructive engagement, and to highlight credible information on this emerging 
issue. We’ve seen tens of millions of Tweets on this topic in the past four weeks 
and that trend looks set to continue. Given the rapidly evolving nature of the issue 
and the growing international response, we’ve launched a new dedicated search 
prompt to ensure that when you come to the service for information about the 
#coronavirus, you’re met with credible, authoritative information first. In 
addition, we’re halting any auto-suggest results that are likely to direct individuals 
to noncredible content on Twitter. This is an expansion of our Know The Facts 
prompt, which we specifically put in place for the public to find clear, credible 
information on immunization and vaccination health. Id. 
49 See Jack Morse, Twitter Steps up Enforcement in the Face of Coronavirus 
Misinformation, MASHABLE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/twitter-cracks-
down-coronavirus-misinformation/; see also COVID-19 Events Page, Twitter, available 
at https://twitter.com/i/events/1219057585707315201. Most tweets and updates are from 
verified news accounts such as the New York Times, Associated Press, and Reuters, as 
well as other public health sources such as the CDC and similar international entities.  
50 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
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resulting in prominent displays of news from mainstream publications including National 
Public Radio, followed by information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the 
World Health Organization.”51  
 
 
[Google search page in response to searching for coronavirus cure, as of July 6, 2020] 
  
 
51 Mark Bergen and Garret De Vynyck, Google Scrubs Coronavirus Misinformation on 
Search, YouTube, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-10/dr-google-scrubs-coronavirus-
misinformation-on-search-youtube.  
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 In addition, YouTube has modified its Terms of Service to prohibit any content that 
directly contradicts advice from the WHO.52 In an update to its monetization policy, 
YouTube announced that it will prohibit videos that seek to capitalize on coronavirus-
related conspiracies, and has directed users instead to videos “debunking” the 
conspiracies.53  
 
 
YouTube, however, like Facebook, has run into difficulties in countering medical 
misinformation on its platform, especially in regions where fact-checking is not as readily 
achievable or practical as in the United States. This is partly a result of the nature of the 
medium itself. YouTube videos typically involve some creative elements such that the 
question of whether the resulting content is true or false becomes more complex and 
nuanced. YouTube has recently adopted the same approach as Google search, providing a 
banner at the top of searches for terms such as “coronavirus” or “coronavirus cure,” that 
provide a link to the CDC’s official page (see below). 
 
 
52 Coronavirus: YouTube Bans ‘Medically Unsubstantiated’ Content, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52388586.  
53 Id.  
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The above page provides a link to the official CDC page on COVID-19: 
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II. PLATFORMS’ EFFORTS TO ADDRESS POLITICAL MISINFORMATION: MEASURES TO 
COMBAT FALSE AND MISLEADING POLITICAL SPEECH AND MICROTARGETING OF POLITICAL 
ADS 
 
Introduction and Misinformation in the 2016 Election 
 
Today’s online information ecosystem continues to be a forum for political and 
election-related misinformation, as it was four years ago in the context of the 2016 election,   
Misinformation and intentionally false disinformation54 on the Internet is particularly 
problematic given that the Internet is a dominant (if not the dominant) source of 
information in the political sphere, with two-thirds of Americans identifying internet 
sources as their leading sources of information in connection with the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election.55 In addition, misinformation spread via social media is much more 
susceptible to being spread faster and farther than is truthful information. According to a 
recent study published in Science,56 false news -- and in particular, false political news -- 
is spread farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth -- with the top 1% of false 
news cascades diffused to between 1,000 and 100,000 people (whereas the truth rarely 
diffused to more than 1,000 people) and with false news diffusing faster than the truth.57 
The authors of the study in Science investigated the differential diffusion of all of the 
verified true and false news stories distributed on Twitter from 2006 to 2017, composed of 
approximately 126,000 stories tweeted by approximately 3 million people more than 4.5 
million times.58 They observed that "[f]alsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, 
deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects 
 
54 In this article, I will use the term “misinformation” to refer to false information 
regardless of whether the speaker of that information had an intent to mislead, and I use 
the term “disinformation” to refer to intentionally false information, where the speaker of 
that information had an intent to mislead. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Word of the Year: 
Misinformation. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/12/10/word-year-misinformation-
heres-why/. 
55 See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 3(10) (2017); PEW RES. CTR., ELECTION 
2016: CAMPAIGNS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF NEWS 28 (2016). 
https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/13/2016/07/PJ_2016.07.18_election-2016_FINAL.pdf. 
56 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News 
Online, SCIENCE, 09 Mar 2018, Vol. 359, Issue 6380, pp. 1146-1151. 
57 Id. 
58 The authors of the study in Science classified news as “true” or “false” using 
information from six independent fact-checking organizations that exhibited 95 to 98% 
agreement on the classifications. Id. 
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were more pronounced for false political news” than for false news concerning other 
subjects, such as natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information.59  
 
False and misleading political content on social media platforms—especially on 
Facebook—played a significant role in influencing members of the electorate leading up 
to the 2016 election.  More than one quarter of voting age adults visited a false news 
website in the final weeks of the 2016 campaign.60  Indeed, in the months leading up to the 
election, the top twenty fake news stories had more “engagements” (which includes shares, 
reactions, and comments) on Facebook (with 8.7 million engagements) than the twenty top 
hard news stories (with 7.3 million engagements).61  In the final three months of the U.S. 
presidential campaign, the top performing fake election news stories on Facebook 
generated more engagements than the top stories from major news outlets such as The New 
York Times, The Washington Post, Huffington Post, and NBC News,62 and material 
generated by Russian operatives reached a hundred and twenty-six million American 
 
59 Interesting, the authors further observe that "[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, robots 
accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate, implying that false news 
spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it." Id. 
But that is not to diminish the role that bots played in Russian interference in the 2016 
election. Foreign interference in our 2016 presidential elections was clearly exacerbated 
by the use of automation in the form of bots, trolls, and fake accounts and by the use of 
microtargeted political advertisements to amplify disinformation, manipulate public 
discourse, exacerbate political and social divisions, and deceive voters on a mass scale, 
especially via Twitter platform, in a manner that was targeted to members of the U.S. 
electorate, especially in swing states. Natasha Bertrand, Twitter Users Spreading Fake 
News Targeted Swing States in the Run-Up to Election Day, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/fake-news-and-propaganda-targeted-swing-
states-before-election-2017-9. Russian bots, for example, were responsible for 30 to 40% 
of election related tweets directed to the swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin, as well as to the battleground states of Ohio, Missouri, Florida, North 
Carolina, and Colorado, during the 2016 presidential elections. Trump won the Electoral 
College because some eighty thousand votes went his way in Wisconsin, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania. See e.g., Kathleen Hall Jamieson, CYBERWAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS 
AND TROLLS HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT 67 (2018). 
60 See Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump? Here’s What 
We Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-
know-about-fake-news-in-the-2016-election.  
61 Id. 
62 See Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories 
Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:15 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-
outperformed-real-news-on-facebook#.emA15rzd0.  
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Facebook users.63  Twitter was a primary target of Russia’s false news and misinformation 
offensives during the 2016 elections, as a St. Petersburg-based troll factory known as the 
Internet Research Agency used Twitter as a vehicle to create fake accounts to exacerbate 
political and social tensions in the United States and to mislead U.S. voters.64  The Internet 
Research Agency controlled more than 3,000 Twitter accounts during the 2016 U.S. 
elections, and another 50,000 automated accounts were connected to the Russian 
government.65  
 
Political Speech and Political Advertising on Social Media Platforms Today 
 
Political advertising on social media platforms is big business–and, as of this 
writing–big and still largely unregulated business in the United States.  The total amount 
spent on digital political advertising in the U.S. is expected to reach $2.9 billion in 2020 
(an increase of over 100% from 2016), with Google and Facebook capturing the vast 
majority of digital political advertising.66 Because of the power of such ads in influencing 
our democratic processes, the method of dissemination -- including the use of 
microtargeting to target specific, narrow segments of the electorate -- and the substance of 
such ads -- including the issue of false and misleading information in such ads -- have been 
subject to intense scrutiny, as discussed below.  
  
Because political advertising has the potential to affect our democratic processes in 
powerful ways, it has traditionally been subject to a host of government regulations, 
including transparency regulations, disclosure and public file regulations, and prohibitions 
on foreign participation, as I discuss below.  Yet, as of this writing, such government 
regulations only apply to traditional media and generally do not apply to online mediums. 
This is despite the fact that Facebook’s user base of 204 million American users, for 
example, is ten times larger than the subscriber base of the largest cable and satellite 
providers and despite the fact that over one billion dollars was spent on online advertising 
in 2016 – and many billions more will be spent on digital advertising in the context of the 
2020 elections.  Although the federal Honest Ads Act was introduced as an attempt to 
 
63 See Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, THE NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-to-
swing-the-election-for-trump/.  
64 See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter is Sweeping Out Fake Accounts Like 
Never Before, Putting User Growth at Risk, WASH. POST (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/06/twitter-is-sweeping-out-fake-
accounts-like-never-before-putting-user-growth-risk.  
65 Id. 
66 Emily Glazer, Facebook Weighs Steps to Curb Narrowly Targeted Ads, WALL STREET 
J. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-discussing-potential-changes-
to-political-ad-policy-11574352887. 
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remedy this regulatory gap and to extend this host of regulations on political advertising to 
social media platforms, as of this writing, the Act has not been enacted into law.  In 
addition, several state legislative attempts to regulate political advertising online have been 
subject to successful First Amendment challenges, as discussed below. Accordingly, the 
social media giants -- Facebook, Twitter, and Google -- have been left to their own devices 
to determine whether and how to regulate political advertising -- and how to regulate the 
microtargeting of political ads -- on their platforms.   
 
 Below in Part A, I briefly survey the current state of the regulation of political 
advertising applicable to traditional mediums of expression. In Part B, I examine the 
proposed federal Honest Ads Act, as well as similar state versions of such legislation. In 
Part C, I turn to the special problems of microtargeting of political advertising on social 
media. I then analyze the steps that the major social media platforms have taken -- and have 
declined to take -- to address the problems caused by false political speech on their forums 
and by the microtargeting of political ads in particular. 
 
 A. Federal Regulation of Political Advertising Applicable to Traditional Media  
 
 Various federal statutes, Federal Election Commission rules, and Federal 
Communications Commission rules currently impose transparency requirements on 
political advertisements disseminated by broadcast, cable, and satellite providers, and also 
impose requirements on these providers prohibiting foreign participation in U.S. 
elections. First, FEC regulations impose transparency requirements on political 
advertisements disseminated via non social media: Any public communication made by a 
political committee — including communications that do not expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate or solicit a contribution — must 
display a disclaimer. Disclaimers must also appear on political committees' internet 
websites, and in certain email communications. All public communications that expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, electioneering 
communications, and all public communications that solicit any contribution require a 
disclaimer, regardless of who has paid for them. Public communications include 
electioneering communications and any other form of general public political 
advertisement, including communications made using the following media: broadcast, 
cable or satellite; newspaper or magazine; outdoor advertising facility; mass mailing (more 
than 500 substantially similar mailings within 30 days); phone bank (more than 500 
substantially similar calls within 30 days); and communications placed for a fee on another 
person’s website.67  
 
67 See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ADVERTISING AND DISCLAIMERS, 
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/advertising/ 
(last accessed Jul. 19, 2020). 
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 Second, what is known as the “Foreign Participation Ban” prohibits foreign 
nationals from attempting to influence elections through donations, expenditures, or other 
things of value.68 Existing regulations applicable to broadcast, cable, and satellite platforms 
include a broad prohibition on the involvement of foreign nationals with elections in the 
United States, under which foreign nationals are prohibited from making any contribution, 
donation, or expenditure in connection with any federal, state, or local election; making 
any contribution or donation to any committee or organization of any national, state, or 
local political party; or making any disbursement for an electioneering communication.  
 
 Third, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which applies to traditional 
media, imposes disclosure and public file requirements, aimed at informing the electorate 
about the source of election related advertisements,  and these provisions have been upheld 
by the Supreme Court.69 BCRA § 311 requires that televised “electioneering 
communications” funded by anyone other than a candidate must include a statement clearly 
indicating who was responsible for the ad (in the form of “[ ______ ] is responsible for the 
content of this advertising”), along with the name and address (or web address) of the 
person who funded the ad.  In addition, BCRA requires that anyone who spent more than 
$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year file a detailed statement 
with the FEC, providing his or her name, amount of expenditure, and the name of the 
election to which the communication was directed, among other details.  In upholding 
BCRA’s disclosure and public file requirements against a First Amendment challenge by 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court explained that these provisions “provid[e] the 
electorate with information” and “insure that voters are fully informed about the person or 
group who is speaking . . . so that people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which 
they are being subjected.”  The Court concluded that these requirements were a less 
restrictive alternative compared to other, more extensive regulations of political speech, 
that “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before 
an election,” and that this “informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application 
of [the Act] to these ads.”  
 
 None of the above regulations currently apply to political advertising on social 
media. 
 
 B. The Proposed Honest Ads Act  
  
 
68 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A).  
69 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
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 As discussed above, various federal statutes and Federal Election Commission 
rules70 currently impose transparency requirements on political advertisements 
disseminated by broadcast, cable, and satellite providers, and also impose requirements on 
these providers prohibiting foreign participation in U.S. elections; yet, social media 
platforms like Google, Facebook, and Twitter are currently not subject to analogous 
regulations. Such social media platforms have been largely immune from Federal Election 
Commission and related regulations that have long been applicable to other sources of news 
and information in our political information ecosystem that mandate transparency and 
accountability requirements.71  
 
The Honest Ads Act, introduced in October 2017 by Senators Mark Warner (D-
Virginia), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota) and the late John McCain (R-Arizona), seeks to 
remedy this regulatory disparity.  The Act attempts to address some of the problems created 
by foreign interference in U.S. elections in the online arena by imposing transparency 
regulations on online political advertisements and by requiring that online platforms 
enforce the longstanding ban on foreign participation in United States elections.72  
Although, as discussed infra, social media platforms like Twitter, Google, and Facebook 
are undertaking substantial measures themselves to address such problems, such measures 
may be revisited or revoked by the platforms at any time; therefore, government regulation 
in the form of the Honest Ads Act is still an important tool for addressing these problems, 
and indeed one that is welcomed by the platforms.73  
 
The Honest Ads Act seeks to address problems in the online marketplace of ideas 
by extending three sets of requirements that have long been imposed on communications 
platforms to online platforms: (1) the expansion of disclosure requirements applicable to 
political advertisements; (2) the expansion of public file requirements; and (3) the 
expansion of the obligation to undertake reasonable efforts to limit foreign interference in 
U.S. elections. 
 
 
70 See Fredreka Schouten, Federal Regulators Approve Narrow Facebook Ad Disclosure, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 15, 2017, 11:42 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/14/federal-regulators-weigh-
whether-unmask-online-political-ad-buyers/951425001. 
71See text accompanying notes x – y.  
72 See S. 1989, 115th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2018). 
73 Both Facebook and Twitter have come out in support of the Honest Ads Act. See 
Aimee Picchi, Facebook: What Is the Honest Ads Act?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-hearings-what-is-the-honest-ads-act; Twitter 
Public Policy (@Policy), TWITTER (Apr. 10, 2018, 8:54 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Policy/status/983734917015199744.  
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 First, the Honest Ads Act extends the disclosure obligations governing political 
advertisements that print, broadcast, and cable advertisements must meet to online 
platforms.74  The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 requires that certain political ads 
in print, broadcast, and cable disclose who has paid for the advertisement.75  This 
requirement currently does not extend to paid Internet or digital advertisements.  Under the 
Honest Ads Act, the Federal Election Campaign Act’s definition of “electioneering 
communication” would be expanded to include online paid political advertisements.76  
Existing federal law also imposes disclosure requirements on “public communications” 
that expressly advocate for a candidate’s election or defeat, are paid for or authorized by a 
candidate, solicit a political contribution, or are by a political committee.  The Honest Ads 
Act would update the definition of “public communication” as well, to ensure that 
disclosure obligations applicable to these types of advertisements extend to the online 
environment.77 
 
Second, under the Honest Ads Act, large digital platforms (those with more than 
fifty million unique monthly visitors) would be required to maintain publicly available 
records of political advertisements by a purchaser whose aggregate requests to purchase 
political advertisements on that platform exceed $500 within the past year.78  Such records 
must include a digital copy of the political advertisement, as well as a description of the 
target audience, the ad rate, the name of the candidate or office that the ad was supporting, 
and the contact information of the purchaser of the ad.79  Like the FCC’s broadcast file 
rules, the Act would apply to ads made by, for, or about political candidates, about 
elections, and about “national legislative issues of public importance.”80  
 
Third, the Honest Ads Act would mandate that all advertising platforms—including 
online platforms — make reasonable efforts to comply with the “foreign participation 
ban.”81  This longstanding ban prohibits foreign nationals from attempting to influence 
elections through donations, expenditures, or other things of value.82  Existing regulations 
applicable to broadcast, cable, and satellite platforms include a broad prohibition on the 
involvement of foreign nationals with elections in the United States, under which foreign 
 
74 S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018) (“The purpose of this Act is to enhance the integrity of 
American democracy and national security by improving disclosure requirements for 
online political advertisements . . . .”). 
75 52 U.S.C. § 30120. 
76 S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018).  
77 Id. § 5. 
78 Id. § 8(a)(1)(A). 
79 Id. § 8(a)(2). 
80 Id. § 8(a)(4). 
81 See id. § 9. 
82 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A).  
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nationals are prohibited from making any contribution, donation, or expenditure in 
connection with any federal, state, or local election; making any contribution or donation 
to any committee or organization of any national, state, or local political party; or making 
any disbursement for an electioneering communication.  The Honest Ads Act would extend 
these prohibitions to the online environment as well. 
 
The Honest Ads Act was reintroduced to the 116th Congress on May 7, 2019 in the 
Senate and May 8, 2019 in the House.83 For several months, it sat before the respective 
Committees on Rules and Administration84 and House Administration.85 In October, the 
Honest Ads Act was incorporated86 into the Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for 
a Lasting Democracy Act,87 passed in the House,88 and it presently sits again before the 
Rules and Administration Committee.89  
 
State Measures to Regulate Political Ads on Social Media  
 
 In the absence of federal legislation, several states have attempted to regulate 
political advertising online, but these attempts have been subject to legal challenges (which 
have been successful, as of this writing). Like the Honest Ads Act, Maryland’s Online 
Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act90 establishes disclosure requirements 
 
83 Zach Montellaro, The Honest Ads Act Returns, POLITICO (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-score/2019/05/09/the-honest-ads-act-
returns-615586. 
84 S.1356- Honest Ads Act, Actions, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1356/all-actions. 
85 H.R.2592- Honest Ads Act, Actions, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2592/all-actions. 
86 Comm. on H. Admin., Markup of H.R. 4617, Stopping Harmful Interference in 
Elections for a Lasting Democracy Act, 116th Cong. (2019) 
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/markups/markup-hr-4617-stopping-harmful-
interference-elections-lasting-democracy. 
87 Not to be confused with the Showing How Isolationism Effects Long-Term 
Development Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
bill/7005?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22SHIELD+Act%22%5D%7D&s=2&r=1.  
88 H.R.4617- SHIELD Act, Actions, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
bill/4617/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R.+4617%22%5D%7D&r=1&
s=1. 
89 S.2669- SHIELD Act, Actions, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/2669/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Stopping+Harmful+Interference+
in+Elections+for+a+Lasting+Democracy%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=3. 
90 Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law § 13-405 (2018). 
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for “qualifying paid digital communications disseminated through the online platform.”91 
Under the Maryland Act, upon notice by the purchaser, the publisher must identify the 
amount paid, and as applicable, the purchaser’s name and controlling interest.92  A number 
of media outlets, including the Washington Post, brought a challenge to this law in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that the Maryland Act infringed their 
First Amendment rights of free speech and free press.93 The court, while crediting 
Maryland’s interest in legislating to prevent misinformation online such as was prevalent 
in the 2016 election,94 nonetheless temporarily enjoined the statute’s enforcement on the 
grounds that the Act was subject to strict scrutiny and therefore likely unconstitutional. 
Although the court held that the state’s interest “in preventing foreign governments and 
their nationals from interfering in their elections” was “compelling,”95 it nonetheless found 
that the Act was both unconstitutionally over- and underinclusive: “[The Act] regulates 
substantially more speech than it needs to, while, at the same time, neglecting to regulate 
the primary tools that foreign operatives exploited to pernicious effect in the 2016 
election.”96 
 
Washington State has also sought to regulate social media companies’ political 
advertisements. In April 2020, Washington State sued Facebook, alleging violations of the 
state’s campaign finance laws. This marks the second action taken by Washington State 
against Facebook for similar violations in the past two years: in December 2018, Facebook 
paid a $200,000 penalty for failure to maintain legally required information under a 
Washington State law governing political ads.97 Washington State requires commercial 
advertisers in all mediums (including social media) to maintain records identifying the 
sponsors of political ads in both state and local elections, and it further requires that these 
 
91 Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law § 13-405(b)(1) (2018). 
92 See Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law § 13-405(b)(6) (2018). 
93 See Washington Post v. McManus, 335 F.Supp.3d 272 (D. Md. 2019) aff’d, No. 19-
1132, 2019 WL 6647336 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2019). 
94 Washington Post, 335 F.Supp.3d at 282 (“It was in February 2018, amid the uproar 
over Russian meddling in American political affairs, that Maryland legislators – noting 
an absence of any federal statutory or regulatory activity aimed at thwarting foreign 
interference in its elections – resolved to act and introduced the bill at issue here.”). 
95 Id., at 300 (“To characterize the State of Maryland's interest in addressing this threat as 
anything less than compelling would be a profound error; on the contrary, the Maryland 
legislature should be commended, not criticized, for attempting to address this threat to 
the fairness of its electoral process.”). 
96 Id.  
97 Washington State Office of the Attorney General, AG Ferguson Sues Facebook for 
Repeatedly Violating Washington Campaign Finance Law (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-sues-facebook-repeatedly-
violating-washington-campaign-finance-law.  
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records be made readily available for public inspection.98 The present case alleges that 
Facebook hosted hundreds of political ads in violation of state law since the time the 
company announced it would stop accepting Washington state political ads.99 Although 
Facebook does store some information about its ads in an online, publicly accessible 
database (Facebook’s Ads Library, discussed infra100), according to the Washington State 
action, Facebook failed to disclose additional information required under applicable state 
law, such as the address of the person who sponsored the advertising, the name of that 
person, the precise cost and dates of payment, and the method of payment.101  
 
In sum, unlike political advertising on traditional media, political advertising on 
social media is currently largely unregulated. 
 
 
C. The Special Problems Caused by Microtargeting of Political Ads 
 
Microtargeting of ads on social media platforms is a practice that generally allows 
advertisers to limit their messaging to narrow slices or subsets of individuals, by exploiting 
the vast trove of social data about individuals’ online behavior and preferences that has 
been collected by social media platforms.102 Microtargeting of ads in general stands in 
sharp contrast to the broadcasting of ads in mediums like major metropolitan newspapers, 
radio and television, through which advertisers provide content to a large and mostly 
homogenous audience (e.g., to all readers of The Washington Post). In contrast, 
microtargeting delivers ad content to very specific subgroups (e.g., readers who shop at 
Whole Foods who are between the ages of 25 and 49, and who have watched a certain 
video on YouTube) or even to specific, listed individuals (by using tools such as 
Facebook’s Custom Audiences).103  The practice of microtargeting employs and capitalizes 
on the social data -- such as an individual’s likes, dislikes, interests, preferences, behaviors 
and viewing and purchasing habits -- collected by social media platforms about their users 
and made available to advertisers to enable advertisers to segment individuals into small 
groups so as to more accurately and narrowly target advertising to them.  Facebook, for 
 
98 RCW 42.17A, https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=42.17A.060. “Timely,” 
here means within 24 hours of the ad’s publication. See supra, n. 56.  
99 AG Ferguson Sues Facebook for Repeatedly Violating Washington Campaign Finance 
Law, supra note 53. 
100 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
101 Id.  
102 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
103 See, e.g., Dipayan Ghosh, What is Microtargeting and What Is It Doing in Our 
Politics?, MOZILLA: INTERNET CITIZEN (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://blog.mozilla.org/internetcitizen/2018/10/04/microtargeting-dipayan-ghosh/.  
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example, reportedly tracks a list of over 1,100 attributes on each of its users spanning users’ 
demographic, behavioral, and interest categories.104  
 
The practice of microtargeting enables advertisers to capitalize on the 
comprehensive social data about individuals collected by social media platforms to design 
and disseminate content that advertisers predict will be the most effective and relevant with 
respect to the targeted segment of individuals. For example, an advertiser might limit the 
scope of an ad’s distribution to single men between 25 and 35 who live in apartments and 
“like” the Washington Nationals.105 While businesses derive certain benefits from the 
microtargeting of ads in nonpolitical contexts, microtargeting of ads in the political context 
can pose serious problems for the democratic process and for the marketplace of ideas 
model that underlies our First Amendment model of freedom of speech.106 Unlike political 
advertising on mass media like broadcast television or radio – in which large national or 
regional audiences are exposed to the same political advertisement – by employing 
narrowcasted microtargeted ads on social media, a political advertiser can craft a specific 
ad to a much narrower intended audience and only that specific audience, thereby 
essentially preventing others from accessing and scrutinizing the content of the ad.  
 
As described by Facebook’s former Chief Security Officer Alex Stamos, the chief 
benefit of political micro-targeting is that allows political advertisers to deploy “messages 
that are extremely finely targeted to a very small number of people.”107 By microtargeting 
political ads, a campaign can make different – and even contradictory – appeals to voters 
in Michigan and voters in New York or Atlanta.  As such, extensively deployed 
microtargeting of political ads – which is by definition immune from the check of broad 
public scrutiny – increases the possibility that a politician might lie with impunity. As 
Stamos explains, “if you allow people to show an ad to just 100 folks and then you run tens 
 
104 See Till Speicher et al., Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted Advertising, 
81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 5, 7 (2018) (“For each user in the US, Facebook 
tracks a list of over 1,100 binary attributes spanning demographic, behavioral and interest 
categories that we refer to as curated attributes. Additionally, Facebook tracks users’ 
interests in entities such as websites, apps, and services as well as topics ranging from 
food preferences (e.g., pizza) to niche interests (e.g., space exploration).”). 
105 Ellen L. Weintraub, Don’t Abolish Political Ads on Social Media. Stop 
Microtargeting., WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/01/dont-abolish-political-ads-social-
media-stop-microtargeting/. 
106 See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1519 (2019). 
107 Peter Kafka, Facebook’s Political Ad Problem, Explained By an Expert, VOX (Dec. 
10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/10/20996869/facebook-political-ads-
targeting-alex-stamos-interview-open-sourced.  
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of thousands of ads, it makes it extremely difficult for your political opponent and the print 
media to call you out.”108 Such microtargeting of political ads also exacerbates problems 
of balkanization, in which the messages that individuals are receiving are so disparate as 
to dissolve the larger communities of interest that otherwise ostensibly bind the country as 
a nation.109 
 
The Internet Research Agency – the notorious agent of Russian disinformation 
during the 2016 election cycle – was able to spend pennies on the dollar (or ruble) 
compared to U.S. presidential campaigns by deploying powerful microtargeted political 
ads on social media. With its use of microtargeted political ads, the Agency was able to 
powerfully leverage its influence to interfere with U.S. elections.  While the Trump and 
 
108 Id. 
109 Craig Timberg, Critics Say Facebook's Powerful Ad Tools May Imperil Democracy. 
But Politicians Love Them., WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/09/critics-say-facebooks-
powerful-ad-tools-may-imperil-democracy-politicians-love-them/. See also Isaac 
Stanley-Becker, Facebook’s Ad Tools Subsidize Partisanship, Research Shows. And 
Campaigns May Not Even Know It., WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/10/facebooks-ad-delivery-system-
drives-partisanship-even-if-campaigns-dont-want-it-new-research-shows/ (Eli Pariser, the 
Internet activist who coined the term “filter bubble” explaining that serving “users with 
information that aligns with their existing worldview ... ‘fragments political discourse.’”).  
A recent study in fact showed that the very mechanism of Facebook’s ad delivery 
increases partisanship. Muhammad Ali, et al, Ad Delivery Algorithms: The Hidden 
Arbiters of Political Messaging, ARXIV 13 (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.04255.pdf (see “Discussion”). The authors isolated the role that 
Facebook’s perception of an ad’s content plays in determining the audience that receives 
it by creating a generic, non-partisan ad with a call to register to vote that linked to a 
generic domain. They then “configured [their] web server to deliver a different response 
for requests for these pages based on the IP address of the requestor.” If the requestor 
were identified as Facebook, it would be served “a copy of the HTML from the official 
Trump campaign website, the official Sanders campaign website, or a generic voting 
information website.” All other requestors were simply “redirected to the generic voting 
information website.” Id. at 7 (See 4.3 “Isolating role of content”). The ads therefore 
appeared identical to users, but misled Facebook’s algorithm to associate them with 
different political content. The authors found that even after selecting a target audience, 
Facebook will prefer delivering the ad to those who it predicts will identify with its 
message. “Counterintuitively, advertisers who target broad audiences may end up ceding 
platforms even more influence over which users ultimately see which ads.” Id. at 1. 
Beyond the “ad creation and targeting phase, where the advertiser selects their desired 
audience,” the actual delivery of the ad further discriminates among possible recipients. 
The selection is “rooted in the desire to show relevant ads to users” and, the study notes, 
“can lead to dramatic skew in delivery along gender and racial lines, even when the 
advertisers aims to reach gender and race-balanced audiences.” Id. at 1-2. 
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Clinton campaigns spent a combined $81 million on pre-election Facebook ads,110 for 
example, the Internet Research Agency was able to sew tremendous discord by spending 
only $46,000.111 This miniscule amount of spending took advantage of the powerful ability 
to target custom audiences by inferring interests from social media users’ social data. The 
Internet Research Agency used the microtargeting tools developed by leading technology 
companies -- including Facebook's advertising customization tools -- to target specific 
audiences that they believed would be particularly susceptible to false and misleading 
election-related information.  In particular, Russian operatives used Facebook’s Custom 
Audiences112 tool to display specific ads and messages to voters who had visited the 
operatives’ fake social media sites -- and used this microtargeting technique to sew division 
among voters – specifically to suppress black voter turnout.113 Facebook's Custom 
Audiences tool allows advertisers (including, in this case, the Russian operatives) to input 
into Facebook's system a specific list of users they wish to target.  While such technological 
tools have long been used by corporate America to deliver advertising to target audiences, 
Facebook and other social media platforms were taken by surprise by the use of such tools 
for purposes of interference in the U.S. elections.  As The Washington Post explains: 
 
[Russian operatives’ microtargeted political ads] focused on such hot-
button issues as illegal immigration, African American political activism 
and the rising prominence of Muslims in the United States. The Russian 
operatives then used a Facebook "retargeting" tool, called Custom 
Audiences, to send specific ads and messages to voters who had visited 
those sites....One such ad featured photographs of an armed black woman 
"dry firing" a rifle — pulling the trigger of the weapon without a bullet in 
the chamber. Investigators believe the advertisement may have been 
 
110 Josh Constine, Trump and Clinton Spent $81M on US Election Facebook Ads, Russian 
Agency $46k, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 1, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/01/russian-
facebook-ad-spend/. 
111 Figure given in testimony: Hearing on Social Media Influence in the 2016 United 
States Elections, Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017) 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-social-media-influence-2016-
us-elections#; See also Nicholas Thompson, A Facebook Executive Apologizes to His 
Company—and to Robert Mueller, WIRED (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-executive-rob-goldman-apologizes-to-company-
and-robert-mueller/; Kevin Roose, On Russia, Facebook Sends a Message It Wishes It 
Hadn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/technology/russia-facebook-trump.html for 
Facebook VP of ads Rob Goldman’s ham-fisted reaction to the difference. 
112 About Website Custom Audiences, FACEBOOK FOR BUS., 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/610516375684216 (Last accessed Jul. 19, 
2020). 
113 Spencer Overton, State Power to Regulate Social Media Companies to Prevent Voter 
Suppression, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1793 (2020). 
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designed to encourage African American militancy and, at the same time, 
to stoke fears within white communities...114 
Russian operatives used other Facebook tools in addition to Custom Audiences  to target 
groups by demographics, geography, gender, and interests. As Clinton Watts, a fellow at 
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, explains, “This means that any American who 
knowingly or unknowingly clicked on a Russian news site may have been targeted through 
Facebook's advertising systems to become an agent of influence — a potentially 
sympathetic American who could spread Russian propaganda with other Americans."115 
Accordingly, "every successful click [provided the Russian operatives with] more data that 
they can use to retarget [thereby speeding up] the influence dramatically."116 Targeted 
Facebook users were then shown ads featuring divisive topics that the Russians wanted to 
promote in their Facebook news feeds, which displayed the ads alongside messages from 
friends and family members. 
 Professor Spencer Overton explains in greater detail how the Russian Internet 
Research Agency used Facebook’s complex ad targeted tools to microtarget political ads 
to African Americans in order to suppress the black vote in the 2016 election.117 Overton 
explains that African American audiences accounted for over 38% of U.S.-focused ads 
purchased by the Internet Research Agency, which created social media accounts that 
falsely claimed they were African American-operated and urged African Americans to 
“boycott the election.” Overton writes: 
Facebook’s “Ad Manager” allows an advertiser to select from a series of 52,000 
targeting attributes, including demographics/ethnic affinity (e.g., African 
American), issue interests (e.g., “Malcolm X” or the “Civil Rights Movement”), 
and Facebook engagement (e.g., liked a particular post). About 73% of the [Internet 
Research Agency’s] ads used interest-based targeting, and most of the interest-
based targeting focused on African American communities and interests like Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali. Facebook 
develops these profiles by collecting vast amounts of data on its two billion users, 
including posts, likes, clicks, profile information, zip codes (including user 
preferences such as “likes” and comments), and by utilizing predictive modeling 
techniques to make inferences. This microtargeting is also enhanced by real-time 
re-targeting algorithms, a constant loop between users’ voluntary choices (e.g., 
 
114 Adam Entous, Craig Timberg, and Elizabeth Dwoskin, Russian Facebook Ads Show 
Black Woman Firing a Rifle, Amid Efforts to Stoke Racial Strife, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/russian-facebook-ads-
showed-a-black-woman-firing-a-rifle-amid-efforts-to-stoke-racial-
strife/2017/10/02/e4e78312-a785-11e7-b3aa-c0e2e1d41e38_story.html.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Spencer Overton, State Power to Regulate Social Media Companies to Prevent Voter 
Suppression, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1793 (2020). 
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liking) and the machine’s feedback on their choices. Another targeting tool — 
Facebook’s Lookalike Audience — allows advertisers to ask Facebook to create 
target audiences that are demographically similar to (i.e., “look like”) another 
clearly defined audience — and by doing so Facebook “clones” audiences …[In 
addition,] Facebook’s Custom Audience function requires that an advertiser give 
Facebook personally identifiable information (e.g., voter records, email addresses) 
of the precise people the advertiser wants to target, and Facebook uses that data to 
identify corresponding social media accounts.118 
 
In short, using Facebook’s powerful microtargeting tools, Russian operatives were able to 
target African-American members of our electorate, sew division, and – among other 
problems – suppress the black vote.  
 
The Internet Research Agency was not alone in its masterful deployment of 
microtargeted political ads in the 2016 presidential election.  The Trump Campaign, for 
example, also targeted black Americans in specific neighborhoods in an effort to decrease 
voter participation.119 The benefit, as then-Trump digital media director Brad Parscale 
described it, was that “only the people we want to see it, see it.”120  Parscale claimed that 
the use of microtargeted political ads on Facebook and Twitter enabled the Trump 
Campaign to be one hundred to two hundred times more effective in targeting members of 
the electorate than the Hillary for President Campaign.121 Whether or not Parscale’s 
particular claim is true, research shows that political microtargeting indeed “had a 
significant effect in persuading undecided voters to support Trump and in persuading 
Republic supporters to turn out on polling day.”122 Specifically, researchers found that 
political advertising on Facebook made voters five to ten percent more likely to vote, and 
that “targeted Facebook campaigning increased the probability that a previously non-
 
118 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119 Joshua Green and Sasha Issenberg, Inside the Trump Bunker, With Days to Go, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-
27/inside-the-trump-bunker-with-12-days-to-go. 
120 Id. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/inside-the-trump-bunker-
with-12-days-to-go 
121 Brad Parscale (@parscale), TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2018, 4:46 PM), 
https://twitter.com/parscale/status/967516077956755457. 
122 University of Warwick, Targeted Facebook Ads Shown to be Highly Effective in the 
2016 Presidential Election, PHYS.ORG (Oct. 25, 2018), https://phys.org/news/2018-10-
facebook-ads-shown-highly-effective.html. 
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aligned voter would vote for Donald Trump by at least five percent” if they were a regular 
Facebook user.123  
 
Problems Caused by Microtargeting Political Ads 
 
 The microtargeting of political ads, compared to the dissemination of political ads 
via traditional media outlets, is problematic for a number of reasons from a free speech 
perspective – and this is not even considering the problems caused by the weaponization 
of microtargeting by Russian operatives interfering in our elections, sewing division, and 
suppressing the black vote.  First, political ads disseminated via traditional media are 
subject to a host of federal regulations requiring transparency, disclosure, limitations on 
foreign interference, etc., as discussed above,124 whereas ads disseminated via social media 
are not. Second, political ads disseminated via traditional media are subject to broad 
exposure and broad public scrutiny – which are necessary for the truth-facilitating features 
of the marketplace of ideas mechanisms to function. Microtargeted ads, on the other hand 
–  which are essentially the “online equivalent of whispering millions of different messages 
into zillions of different ears for maximum effect and with minimum scrutiny”125 – are not 
similarly subject to broad exposure or broad public scrutiny. Third, and relatedly, 
microtargeted ads on social media are more likely to be susceptible to the spread of 
misinformation. As politics and technology expert Dipayan Ghosh explains: 
“[Microtargeting of political ads facilitates] organic shares and reshares of content pushed 
by unpaid users who appreciate what they see ... and wish to spread it around their 
networks. This results in free content consumption for the political campaign….[and this] 
viral spread of unpaid or organic content ... further encourages the success of 
misinformation campaigns.”126 
 
 In short, the microtargeting of political ads disseminated via social media is 
especially pernicious because it is not subject to regulatory scrutiny, not subject to 
meaningful widespread public scrutiny, and because – as discussed above – false claims in 
 
123 Federica Liberini, et al, Politics in the Facebook Era: Evidence from the 2016 
Presidential Election, 5 (Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, 
Working Paper No. 389, Oct. 2018),  
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/389-
2018_redoano.pdf. 
124 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
125 Kara Swisher, Google Changed Its Political Ad Policy. Will Facebook Be Next?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/opinion/google-political-
ads.html. 
126 Dipayan Ghosh, What is Microtargeting and What Is It Doing in Our Politics?, 
MOZILLA: INTERNET CITIZEN (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://blog.mozilla.org/internetcitizen/2018/10/04/microtargeting-dipayan-ghosh/. 
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such political ads are likely to be spread farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than true 
claims in political ads.127 
 
Measures to Address False Political Advertising and Microtargeting by Social Media 
Platforms 
 
As of this writing, despite a heightened awareness of the problems caused by 
microtargeted political advertising and by false political ads, such problems have yet to be 
effectively addressed via regulation or legislation (at least in the United States). Instead, 
political advertising on social media– and the regulation of false political speech and 
microtargeting in particular – is subject to an ad hoc patchwork of voluntary, piecemeal 
measures recently adopted by the social media platforms themselves. Some of the social 
media platforms – notably Twitter – are adopting rigorous measures to combating such 
problems, while others – notably Facebook – have adopted more of a hand-off approach, 
at least with respect to political ads that constitute “direct speech by politicians.”128 Below 
I examine the measures undertaken by the social media platforms to address problems 
caused by the microtargeting of political ads and by false and misleading political ads. 
Twitter’s Regulation of Political Ads 
 Of the three major social media platforms, Twitter has taken the most aggressive 
stance with respect to false and misleading political ads – by banning political ads 
altogether. In October 2019, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey announced that the platform would 
ban all political advertising.129 The decision places Twitter in stark contrast with Facebook, 
which allows political ads and exempts politicians’ political ads from its fact-checking 
program130 and whose CEO Mark Zuckerberg had stridently defended his company’s 
laissez-faire attitude towards political content moderation on the grounds that this approach 
upholds the ideal of free expression.131 By contrast, Dorsey distinguished Twitter’s new 
policy by explaining that it is not about free expression, but rather about politicians “paying 
for reach.”132  
 
127 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
128 See text accompanying notes x – y.  
129 Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952. 
130 Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 
24, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/. 
131 Cecilia Kang and Mike Isaac, Defiant Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Police 
Political Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/zuckerberg-facebook-free-speech.html. 
132 Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 20, 2019, 4:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634377057067008. 
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 Twitter published its policy for implementing its political advertising ban on 
November 11, 2019, a little less than a year before the 2020 presidential election. Twitter 
defines political content as that which “references a candidate, political party, elected or 
appointed government official, election, referendum, ballot measure, legislation, 
regulation, directive, or judicial outcome.”133 Ads that reference the above, including by 
“appeals for votes, solicitations of financial support, and advocacy for or against any of the 
above-listed types of political content” are prohibited. PACs, SuperPACs, candidates, 
political parties, and elected or appointed government officials are also banned from 
advertising on Twitter.134 There are, however, some exemptions. Advertisers that Twitter 
deems to be news publishers may reference political content so long as the reference does 
not amount to advocacy.135  
 
 Twitter’s Legal, Policy and Trust & Safety Lead Vijaya Gadde also identified an 
exemption for “cause-based ads”136 – ads that “educate, raise awareness, and/or call for 
people to take action in connection with civic engagement, economic growth, 
environmental stewardship, or social equity causes.”137 Political organizations, candidates, 
and politicians may not use such ads, but other groups may.138 Among other restrictions,139 
caused-based ads may not be micro-targeted. Twitter’s allowance of caused-based ads is 
an apparent response to initial criticism of Twitter’s policy. Many users reacted to Twitter’s 
announcement by requesting more precise definitions, including questions about what 
 
133 Political Content, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-
policies/prohibited-content-policies/political-content.html (last accessed July 19, 2020). 
134 Political Content FAQs, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-
policies/prohibited-content-policies/political-content/political-content-faqs.html (last 
accessed July 19, 2020). 
135 Political Content, supra note 90. Such publishers must have a minimum of 100,000 
monthly unique visitors in the United States. They must also have a searchable archive, 
may not be primarily user-generated or aggregated content, and must not be dedicated to 
a single issue. How to Get Exempted As a News Publisher from the Political Content 
Policy, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-
policies/political-content/news-exemption.html (last accessed July 19, 2020). 
136 Vijaya Gadde (@vijaya), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2019, 1:30 PM), 
https://twitter.com/vijaya/status/1195408747926917120. 
137 Cause-Based Advertising Policy, TWITTER: BUS., 
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/restricted-content-policies/cause-based-
advertising.html (last accessed July 19, 2020). 
138 @vijaya supra note 93. https://twitter.com/vijaya/status/1195408747926917120.  
139 Restrictions include certification for caused-based advertisers. Cause-Based 
Advertiser Certification, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-
policies/ads-content-policies/cause-based-advertising/cause-based-certification.html (last 
accessed July 19, 2020). 
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constitutes a “political” ad140 and what constitutes an “ad.”141 As yet, it is unclear. Twitter 
states that for-profit organizations may place “cause ads” if they do not “have the primary 
goal of driving political, judicial, legislative, or regulatory outcomes” and are “tied to the 
organization’s publicly stated values, principles, and or/beliefs.”142 However, it is not clear 
at this time how Twitter will interpret the “primary goal” language in its policy.143  
 
In addition to prohibiting political ads on its platform, Twitter recently announced 
measures to combat misinformation in the form of manipulated media like deepfakes and 
shallow fakes.144 On February 4, 2020, Twitter announced its new policy on “synthetic and 
manipulated media,”145 which provides: “You may not deceptively share synthetic or 
manipulated media that are likely to cause harm. In addition, we may label Tweets 
 
140 https://twitter.com/aaronhuertas/status/1189672683400761344 
141 Brad Koenig (@MavsLaker), TWITTER (Oct. 31, 2019, 4:19 PM), 
https://twitter.com/MavsLaker/status/1190000411559780358. 
142 Cause-Based Advertising FAQs, TWITTER: BUS., 
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/cause-based-
advertising/faqs.html (last accessed July 19, 2020). 
143 Some have commented that Sierra Club could promote their causes but not single out 
politicians or legislation, or that a group could run a gun violence awareness ad but not 
call for a ban on assault weapons as that would imply a legislative outcome. Sheila Dang 
and Paresh Dave, Twitter Tightens Bans on Political Ads and Causes Ahead of 2020 U.S. 
Election, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-politics-
adban-idUSKBN1XP224 Others have observed the challenges Twitter can expect to face 
in distinguishing between causes and political outcomes, for instance is an ad about 
universal healthcare a cause or is it about a related bill and how would that be 
determined? Id. Still others have observed that, if Twitter’s misinformation policy is not 
integrated with its cause-based ads policy, Twitter could still permit inaccurate, but 
“softer” talking points that don’t rise to the level of lobbying, e.g. an anti-minimum wage 
ad would not be permitted but an inaccurate ad about how a minimum wage law 
bankrupted a town could conceivably be permitted. Emily Stewart, Twitter Is Walking 
into a Minefield with Its Political Ads Ban, VOX: RECODE (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/11/15/20966908/twitter-political-ad-ban-policies-
issue-ads-jack-dorsey. 
144 A “deepfake” is defined as a “product of artificial intelligence or machine learning, 
including deep learning techniques (e.g., a technical deepfake), that merges, combines, 
replaces, and/or superimposes content onto a video, creating a video that appears 
authentic.” See, e.g., Danielle K. Citron & Robert Chesney, Deep Fakes: A Looming 
Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 1753 (2019); Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: 
American Election Law in a Post Truth World, U. C. Irvine Legal Studies Research Paper 
2019. 
145 See Yoel Roth & Ashita Achuthan, Building rules in public: Our approach to 
synthetic & manipulated media, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/new-approach-to-synthetic-and-
manipulated-media.html. 
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containing synthetic and manipulated media to help people understand their authenticity 
and to provide additional context.”146 Pursuant to this rule, Twitter will label content that 
is deceptively altered or fabricated, and will remove content if it impacts public safety or 
is likely to cause serious harm.147  Twitter has already shown, on five separate occasions, 
 
146 Synthetic and Manipulated Media Policy, TWITTER HELP CENTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media (last visited July 19, 
2020). 
147 Id.  Relevant portions of Twitter’s synthetic and manipulated media policy are as 
follows: You may not deceptively promote synthetic or manipulated media that are likely 
to cause harm. In addition, we may label Tweets containing synthetic and manipulated 
media to help people understand their authenticity and to provide additional context. 
[W]e may label Tweets that include media (videos, audio, and images) that have been 
deceptively altered or fabricated. In addition, you may not share deceptively altered 
media on Twitter in ways that mislead or deceive people about the media's authenticity 
where threats to physical safety or other serious harm may result.….In order for content 
to be labeled or removed under this policy, we must have reason to believe that media, or 
the context in which media are presented, are significantly and deceptively altered or 
manipulated. …In assessing whether media have been significantly and deceptively 
altered or fabricated, some of the factors we consider include: 
• whether the content has been substantially edited in a manner that fundamentally 
alters its composition, sequence, timing, or framing;  
• any visual or auditory information (such as new video frames, overdubbed audio, 
or modified subtitles) that has been added or removed; and 
• whether media depicting a real person have been fabricated or simulated 
We are most likely to take action (either labeling or removal…) on more significant 
forms of alteration, such as wholly synthetic audio or video or content that has been 
doctored (spliced and reordered, slowed down) to change its meaning. Subtler forms of 
manipulated media, such as isolative editing, omission of context, or presentation with 
false context, may be labeled or removed on a case-by-case basis. … 
In order to determine if media have been significantly and deceptively altered or 
fabricated, we may use our own technology or receive reports through partnerships with 
third parties. In situations where we are unable to reliably determine if media have been 
altered or fabricated, we may not take action to label or remove them. 
…We also consider whether the context in which media are shared could result in 
confusion or misunderstanding or suggests a deliberate intent to deceive people about the 
nature or origin of the content, for example by falsely claiming that it depicts reality. We 
assess the context provided alongside media to see whether it makes clear that the media 
have been altered or fabricated. Some of the types of context we assess in order to make 
this determination include: 
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that it will place warnings on posts from the President that violate its policies, such as its 
policies on abusive behavior and on misinformation, including manipulated media.148 
 
• The text of the Tweet accompanying or within media 
• Metadata associated with media  
• Information on the profile of the account sharing media 
• Websites linked in the Tweet, or in the profile of the account sharing media 
… 
Tweets that share synthetic and manipulated media are subject to removal under this 
policy if they are likely to cause serious harm. Some specific harms we consider include: 
• Threats to the physical safety of a person or group 
• Risk of mass violence or widespread civil unrest 
• Threats to the privacy or ability of a person or group to freely express themselves 
or participate in civic events… 
We also consider the time frame within which the content may be likely to impact public 
safety or cause serious harm, and are more likely to remove content under this policy if 
we find that immediate harms are likely to result from the content’s presence on 
Twitter….In most cases, if we have reason to believe that media shared in a Tweet have 
been significantly and deceptively altered or fabricated, we will provide additional 
context on Tweets sharing the media where they appear on Twitter. This means we may: 
• Apply a label to the content where it appears in the Twitter product; 
• Show a warning to people before they share or like the content; 
• Reduce the visibility of the content on Twitter and/or prevent it from being 
recommended; and/or 
• Provide a link to additional explanations or clarifications, such as in a Twitter 
Moment or landing page. 
In most cases, we will take all of the above actions on Tweets we label. 
Media that meet all three of the criteria defined above—i.e. that are synthetic or 
manipulated, shared in a deceptive manner, and is likely to cause harm—may not be 
shared on Twitter and are subject to removal. Accounts engaging in repeated or severe 
violations of this policy may be permanently suspended. 
 
 https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-
media#:~:text=Overview,are%20likely%20to%20cause%20harm.&text=In%20addition
%2C%20you%20may%20not,other%20serious%20harm%20may%20result. 
148 Twitter’s first warning labels on Tweets from the President involved unsubstantiated 
claims about mail-in ballots being fraudulent, glorifying violence/use of force, and a 
manipulated video (discussed further below). Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter’s Decision to 
Label Trump’s Tweets Was Two Years in the Making, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/29/inside-twitter-trump-label/. As 
of the time of this writing, Twitter most recently affixed a warning label to a second 
Tweet from the President promoting use of force against protestors, citing its policy 
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In the first case of Twitter applying its new policy on disinformation through 
deliberately altered content, Twitter labeled as “manipulated media” an edited video 
featuring presidential candidate Joe Biden in which Biden appeared to be endorsing 
President Trump for re-election in 2020, which was tweeted by White House social media 
director Dan Scavino and retweeted by the President.149  The video had been edited so as 
to mislead viewers into believing that Biden was actually endorsing Trump.  
 
 
 
 
In short, Twitter’s absolute ban on political ads and its restrictions on manipulated 
media constitute strong and likely effective measures toward addressing the problems of 
false and misleading political speech. Some skeptics of the ban, however, have pointed 
out that the ban will not affect “organic” content or messages from politicians that are 
shared or retweeted by supporters, and that it could encourage the use of “bots” or paid 
 
regarding “the presence of a threat of harm against an identifiable group.” Rachel 
Lerman, Twitter Slaps Another Warning Label on Trump Tweet About Force, Wash. Po 
(June 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/23/twitter-slaps-
another-warning-label-trump-tweet-about-force/. Facebook left the post up without a 
warning. Id. 
149 See Ivan Mehta, Trump’s Retweet with doctored Biden Video Earns Twitter’s First 
‘Manipulated Media’ Label, THE NEXT WEB (March 9, 2020), 
https://thenextweb.com/twitter/2020/03/09/trumps-tweet-with-doctored-biden-video-
earns-twitters-first-manipulated-media-label/. 
 
42 
 
users to amplify the tweets.150 In addition, it remains to be seen whether Twitter’s carve-
out for caused-based ads will provide sufficient opportunities for important speech on 
topics of civic and social activism.  
Facebook’s Regulation of Falsity in Political Ads 
Facebook is taking a number of steps to combat misinformation in general on its 
platform.151  The company has adopted extensive measure to combat publicly-available 
misinformation, including by partnering with independent third-party fact checkers to 
evaluate posts, providing counterspeech in the form of “Related Articles”/“Additional 
Reporting on This” on topics similar to false or misleading posts, and limiting the 
distribution of posts from content providers who repeatedly share false news and 
eliminating their ability to profit.152  These extensive measures to combat misinformation 
and false content on Facebook are applicable to political content and political ads, but are 
not applicable to posts that are considered “direct speech by a politician.”  Thus, under 
Facebook’s currently applicable fact-checking policies, political speech and the content of 
political ads are subject to fact-checking – except if such content constitutes “direct speech 
by a politician.”  This exception for politicians’ content has come under substantial scrutiny 
in recent months, especially given the highly controversial posts of President Trump.  
Before examining this controversial exception to Facebook’s general fact-checking policy 
for public posts on its platform, I first examine the company’s generally-applicable policy 
itself.  
Facebook’s General Fact-Checking Policy for Publicly-Available Posts  – Excluding the 
Posts of Politicians 
    Facebook is continuing to expand the partnership that it began in December 2016 
with fact-checkers to evaluate publicly-available content posted on its platform.153  
Through its fact-checking initiatives, Facebook is working with select independent third-
party fact checkers, which are certified through the non-partisan International Fact-
 
150 See https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/twitter-exempts-some-
cause-based-messages-from-political-ad-ban/ 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/15/twitter-world-leaders-break-rules/ 
 
151 See Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: What’s Facebook’s Strategy for Stopping False 
News?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 23, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/hard-questions-false-news. 
152 See Hunt Allcott et al., Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media 
app. at 4 (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 18-029, 2018), 
http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fake-news-trends-appx.pdf (listing in Table 
1 all of Facebook’s efforts to combat false news). 
153 See Lyons, supra note x. 
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Checking Network.154  In the United States, the certified fact-checking organizations with 
whom Facebook works are the Associated Press, factcheck.org, Lead Stories, Check Your 
Fact, Science Feedback, and PolitiFact.155  (Notably, Facebook had added The Weekly 
Standard to these ranks for a period of time in an attempt to respond to critics who claimed 
that its fact-checking program was politically biased, but this publication is now defunct.) 
Facebook has expanded its fact-checking initiative to include the fact checking of 
all public, newsworthy Facebook posts, including links, articles, photos, and videos.156  The 
fact-checking process on Facebook also applies to political advertisements -- except if 
those advertisements (or other posts) constitute "direct speech made by an elected 
official."157 As Facebook explains, “Posts and ads from politicians are generally not 
subjected to fact-checking [including] politicians at every level. This means candidates 
running for office, current office holders - and, by extension, many of their cabinet 
appointees - along with political parties and their leaders.” This conspicuous exception to 
Facebook's fact-checking process has major ramifications for the political process, and has 
subjected Facebook to substantial criticism in recent months.  Below, I first examine 
Facebook's fact-checking process generally, and then turn to the exception to this process 
for posts made by elected officials (including their political advertisements). 
  
Facebook's fact-checking process can be initiated by Facebook users by flagging a 
post as being potentially false. Subject to the exception for direct speech by politicians, any 
public, newsworthy post (including text, photos, and videos) can be flagged for fact-
checking, either by a user, by an outside journalist, or – as is most commonly the case – by 
Facebook's machine learning algorithms. For a user to flag a post as potentially false, a 
 
154 See id. and https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories  
 
155 See Mike Ananny, Checking in with the Facebook Fact-Checking Partnership, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebook-fact-
checking-partnerships.php; see also How Are Third-Party Fact-Checkers Selected?, 
FACEBOOK HELP CENT., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1599660546745980?helpref=faq_content (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2018); Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK 
HELP CENT., https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed 
July 19, 2020). 
156 See Antonia Woodford, Expanding Fact-Checking to Photos and Videos, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (Sept. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/expanding-fact-
checking. 
157 “If a claim is made directly by a politician on their Page, in an ad or on their website, 
it is considered direct speech and ineligible for our third party fact checking program — 
even if the substance of that claim has been debunked elsewhere.” Fact-Checking on 
Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK HELP CENT., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed July 19, 
2020). 
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user clicks “. . .” next to the post he or she wishes to flag as false, then clicks “Report post,” 
then clicks “It’s a false news story,” then clicks “Mark this post as false news.”158  
 
Once a post is flagged by a user as a potential false news story, it is submitted for 
evaluation to a third-party independent fact-checker.159  While the process of evaluating 
posts in the past was triggered only by user flagging, Facebook now incorporates other 
ways of triggering such evaluation, including by providing its independent fact checkers 
with the authority to proactively identify posts to review160 as well as by using machine 
learning to identify potentially false posts.161  For each piece of content up for review, a 
fact checker has the option of providing one of eight different ratings: false, mixture, false 
headline, true, not eligible (if, for example, the post is not verifiable, opinion, etc.), satire, 
opinion, or prank generator.162 
 
Once a third-party fact-checker has determined that a post is false, Facebook then 
initiates several steps.  First, Facebook deprioritizes false posts in users’ News Feeds, i.e., 
the constantly updating list of stories in the middle of a user’s home page (including status 
updates, photos, videos, links, app activity, and likes)—such that future views of each false 
post will be reduced by an average of eighty percent.163  Second, Facebook commissions a 
fact-checker to write a “Related Article” or “Additional Reporting on This” setting forth 
truthful information about the subject of the false post and the reasons why the fact-checker 
rated the post as false.164  Such content is then displayed in conjunction with the false post 
 
158 See How Do I Mark a Post as False News?, FACEBOOK HELP CENT., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/572838089565953?helpref=faq_content (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2018). Alternatively, a user can click “. . .” next to a post, then click “Find 
Support or Report Post,” then select “False News.”  
159 See Lyons, supra note x (“[W]hen people on Facebook submit feedback about a story 
being false or comment on an article expressing disbelief, these are signals that a story 
should be reviewed.”). 
160 See id. (“Independent third-party fact-checkers review the stories, rate their accuracy, 
and write an article explaining the facts behind their rating.”). 
161 See Dan Zigmond, Machine Learning, Fact-Checkers and the Fight Against False 
News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 8, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/04/inside-
feed-misinformation-zigmond. 
162 Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK HELP CENT., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed July 19, 
2020). 
163 See id.; see also Tessa Lyons, Increasing Our Efforts to Fight False News, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (June 21, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/increasing-our-
efforts-to-fight-false-news/. 
164 See Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags With Related Articles, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feed-fyi-
updates-in-our-fight-against-misinformation. 
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on the same subject.165  While Facebook formerly flagged false news sites with a 
“Disputed” flag, the company changed its approach in response to research suggesting that 
such flags may actually entrench beliefs in the disputed posts.  Facebook now provides 
“Related Articles”/“Additional Reporting on This” in conjunction with false news stories 
(which apparently does not result in similar entrenchment).166  In addition, users who 
attempt to share the false post will be notified that the post has been disputed and will be 
informed of the availability of a “Related Article”/“Additional Reporting on This,” as will 
users who earlier shared the false post,167 as in the example below (setting forth Facebook 
and Instagram’s flags).168 
 
165 See id.; see also Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Fell for Facebook Fake News.  Here’s Why 
Millions of You Did Too., WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/18/i-fell-facebook-fake-news-
heres-why-millions-you-did-too/ (describing steps undertaken by Facebook to respond to 
fake video, including posting “Additional Reporting on This,” with links to reports from 
fact-checking organizations); supra Lyons, note 14; Sara Su, New Test with Related 
Articles, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feed-fyi-new-test-with-related-articles. 
166 See Lyons, supra note x (explaining that “[a]cademic research on correcting 
misinformation has shown that putting a strong image, like a red flag, next to an article 
may actually entrench deeply held beliefs . . . [but that] Related Articles, by contrast, are 
simply designed to give more context, which our research has shown is a more effective 
way to help people get to the facts. . . . [W]e’ve found that when we show Related 
Articles next to a false news story, it leads to fewer shares than when the Disputed Flag is 
shown.”). 
167 See Lyons, supra note x. 
168 Elle Hunt, ‘Disputed by Multiple Fact-Checkers’: Facebook Rolls Out New Alert to 
Combat Fake News, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/22/facebook-fact-checking-tool-fake-
news. 
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In addition, As Facebook explains: "When fact-checkers write articles with more 
information about a story, you'll see them in Related Articles immediately below the story 
in your News Feed."169 Facebook also provides its users who are about to share posts that 
have been debunked by a fact-checker by alerting them to additional reporting. Facebook 
users are provided with the following notice, in an attempt to keep such false posts from 
going viral: "Before you share this content, you might want to know that there's additional 
reporting on this from [list of fact-checkers that have debunked the post]."170  As an 
 
169 How is Facebook Addressing False News Through Third-Party Fact-Checkers, 
FACEBOOK HELP CENT., https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536 (last visited 
July 21, 2020).  
170 See Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK BUS., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed Dec. 12, 
2019).  
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example, Facebook users who attempted to share the infamous video of Nancy Pelosi, 
which was doctored to make it appear that she was drunk and slurring her words, were 
alerted to the fabrication.171 In addition, Facebook will now post more prominent fact-
checking labels as interstitials warnings atop photos and videos on Facebook (and 
Instagram) that were fact-checked as false, as in the examples below.  
  
Third, content providers—i.e., Facebook pages and domains—that repeatedly 
publish and/or share false posts will have their ability to monetize and advertise reduced 
and ultimately disabled by Facebook unless and until they issue corrections or successfully 
dispute fact-checkers’ determination that their posts are false.172 
 
Facebook's Policies Regarding False Political Ads 
  
With respect to false political ads, Facebook's policy is complex. Although 
Facebook has implemented extensive measures with respect to false posts generally 
(described above), this false news policy does not apply to “direct speech” by politicians.  
Accordingly, Facebook’s general false news policy -- composed of the fact-checking 
process described above  -- has an exception for “direct speech” by politicians, such that 
direct speech by politicians is not run through Facebook's external fact checking process.  
Facebook provides the following justification for this exception to its fact-checking policy: 
  
We rely on third-party fact-checkers to help reduce the spread of false news and 
other types of viral misinformation, like memes or manipulated photos and videos. 
We don’t believe, however, that it’s an appropriate role for us to referee political 
debates and prevent a politician’s speech from reaching its audience and being 
subject to public debate and scrutiny. ...This means that we will not send organic 
content or ads from politicians to our third-party fact-checking partners for 
review.173 
 
171 Cecilia Kang, Nancy Pelosi Criticizes Facebook for Handling of Altered Videos, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/technology/facebook-
pelosi-video (“People who see the video in feed, try to share it from feed, or already 
shared it are alerted that it’s false.”).  
172 See Satwik Shukla & Tessa Lyons, Blocking Ads from Pages That Repeatedly Share 
False News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/08/blocking-ads-from-pages-that-repeatedly-share-
false-news; https://www.facebook.com/business/help/182222309230722 
173 Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sep. 
24, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/. Facebook 
will, however, subject the posts of political action committees and political advocacy 
groups to its fact-checking process. Facebook has explained that while it will not fact 
check political ads from candidates, it does evaluate the accuracy of political ads from 
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Posts and ads that constitute “direct speech” from current “politicians” at any/every 
level and their appointees -- i.e., the politician’s own claim or statement -- are not 
subjected to fact-checking -- even if the substance of the claim has been debunked 
elsewhere.174 
  
         Facebook’s decision not to submit direct speech from current politicians to fact-
checking is apparently grounded in the belief that such political speech is already subject 
to sufficient scrutiny among the polity and the free press and should not be subject to further 
scrutiny by Facebook’s fact-checkers.  Facebook further justifies its policies as follows: 
"In a democracy, people should decide what is credible, not tech companies...That’s why­–
like other internet platforms and broadcasters– we don’t fact check ads from politicians."175  
The company further justifies its decision by adverting to the importance of political ads 
to challengers and local candidates: "Given the sensitivity around political ads, we have 
considered whether we should ban them altogether...But political ads are important for 
local candidates, up-and-coming challengers, and advocacy groups that use our platform 
to reach voters and their communities.”176 
 
As a result, political speech and political ads made by politicians themselves – posts 
and campaign ads by politicians – operate in a separate system on Facebook. While 
ordinary users who publicly post false content are subject to a range of actions and 
consequences –including possibly outright ban from Facebook177 – elected officials are 
exempt from such consequences. 
  
         Facebook's decision not to screen for or remove false ads by politicians came into 
sharp focus in October 2019, when President Donald Trump’s reelection campaign began 
running an ad that was proven to be false178 about former Vice President Joe Biden on 
 
political advocacy groups or political action committees. See David Klepper, Facebook 
Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads, AP NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019),  
https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2.  
174 Fact-Checking on Facebook: What Publishers Should Know, FACEBOOK BUS., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/182222309230722 (last accessed Dec. 12, 
2019) (emphasis added).  
175 David Klepper, Facebook Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads, AP 
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019),  https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2. 
176 David Klepper, Facebook Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads, AP 
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019),  https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2. 
177 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
178 Amy Sherman, Donald Trump Ad Misleads About Joe Biden, Ukraine, and the 
Prosecutor, POLITIFACT (Oct. 11, 2019), 
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Facebook. The Trump Campaign released a 30-second video ad accusing Biden of 
promising Ukraine money in exchange for firing a prosecutor investigating a company with 
ties to Biden’s son, Hunter Biden.179 The video ad falsely claimed that Joe Biden offered 
Ukraine $1 billion in aid if Ukraine pushed out the official investigating a company tied to 
Hunter Biden. The Biden campaign asked Facebook to take down the ad, but Facebook 
refused. In justifying its refusal, Facebook’s head of global elections policy Katie Harbath 
explained: “Our approach is grounded in Facebook’s fundamental belief in free expression, 
respect for the democratic process, and the belief that, in mature democracies with a free 
press, political speech is already arguably the most scrutinized speech there is.”  
Accordingly, the false Trump Campaign ad on Biden remained available on Facebook, 
garnering at least 4.6 million views.180  
 
 Former presidential candidate Senator Elizabeth Warren -- who has a history of  
locking horns with Facebook and with big tech in general181 -- took particular aim at 
Facebook’s policy towards political ads by placing an intentionally false ad on the platform 
 
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/oct/11/donald-trump/trump-ad-misleads-
about-biden-ukraine-and-prosecut/. 
179 Michael M. Grynbaum & Tiffany Hsu, CNN Rejects 2 Trump Campaign Ads, Citing 
Inaccuracies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/business/media/cnn-trump-campaign-ad.html.  
180 Jeremy B. Merrill, While Everyone Was Looking at Facebook, Trump’s False Biden 
Ad Appeared More Often on YouTube, QUARTZ (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://qz.com/1739780/trumps-biden-ad-appeared-more-often-on-youtube-than-on-
facebook/. 
181 See Elizabeth Warren, (@TeamWarren), Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-
big-tech-9ad9e0da324c. After announcing her ambition to break up big tech companies, 
Warren took out ads on Facebook that denounced Facebook itself as well as Amazon and 
Google for their “vast power over our economy and our democracy.” Cristiano Lima, 
Facebook Backtracks After Removing Warren Ads Calling for Facebook Breakup, 
POLITICO (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/11/facebook-
removes-elizabeth-warren-ads-1216757. Facebook initially removed the ads, apparently 
because they contained an unauthorized reproduction of Facebook’s logo, but soon after, 
the company reversed course and restored them “in the interest of allowing robust 
debate.” Isaac Stanley-Becker and Tony Romm, Facebook Deletes, and Then Restores, 
Elizabeth Warren’s Ads Criticizing the Platform, Drawing Her Rebuke, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/12/facebook-deletes-
then-restores-elizabeth-warrens-ads-criticizing-platform-drawing-her-rebuke/; Elizabeth 
Warren, Elizabeth’s Plan: Break up the Big Tech Companies, FACEBOOK (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.facebook.com/ElizabethWarren/videos/396777104233421/. Warren 
meanwhile warned of the danger of a “social media marketplace” that is “dominated by a 
single censor.” Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Mar. 11, 2019, 7:59 PM), 
https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1105256905058979841. 
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in October 2019. Warren’s ad declared that “Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook just endorsed 
Donald Trump for re-election.”182 She explained that the ad was a test to see “just how far” 
Facebook’s policy went and accused Facebook of becoming a “disinformation-for-profit 
machine.”183 Adhering to its policy of refusing to fact-check direct speech by politicians, 
Facebook declined to remove Warren’s intentionally (and provocatively) false ad, stating 
“if Senator Warren wants to say things she knows to be untrue, we believe Facebook should 
not be in the position of censoring that speech.”184 
 
 At least one of Facebook’s fact-checking partners expressed dissatisfaction with 
the company’s policy of refusing to fact-check direct speech by politicians. Lead Stories – 
one of Facebook’s six fact-checking organizations in the United States – has argued that 
Facebook should modify its policy and should scrutinize ads from politicians and 
recommended that such a fact-checking process should be reviewed by a new nonpartisan 
blue-ribbon panel.185 This fact-checking partner reportedly proposed these changes to the 
policy at Facebook’s November 2019 fact-checking partner summit. Alan Duke, Lead 
Stories’ editor-in chief, contended that there is “an urgent need for a fair method to identify 
egregiously false political ads in 2020” because “too many people are too fast to fall for 
disinformation.”186 However, Facebook declined to make any changes in its fact-checking 
policy in response. 
 
 In addition, Facebook employees recently rose up in strong opposition to 
Facebook’s policy exempting politicians’ (and especially President Trump’s) posts from 
fact-checking (and from other of the company’s content policies as well, including those 
prohibiting threats of imminent violence). The particular flashpoint most recently at issue 
involved violent speech, not misinformation, in the form of Donald Trump’s May 2020 
post following the murder of George Floyd and the ensuing demonstrations. Trump 
 
182 Brian Fung, Elizabeth Warren Targets Facebook’s Ad Policy -- with a Facebook Ad, 
CNN (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/politics/elizabeth-warren-
facebook-ad/index.html. 
183 Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2019, 10:01 AM), 
https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1183019880867680256.  
184 Brian Fung, Elizabeth Warren Targets Facebook’s Ad Policy -- with a Facebook Ad, 
CNN (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/politics/elizabeth-warren-
facebook-ad/index.html. 
185 See Donie O’Sullivan, A Facebook Fact-Checker Will Propose a Possible Solution to 
the Company’s False Ad Debacle, CNN (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/31/tech/facebook-fact-checking-political-ads/index.html. 
186 Donie O’Sullivan, A Facebook Fact-Checker Will Propose a Possible Solution to the 
Company’s False Ad Debacle, CNN (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/31/tech/facebook-fact-checking-political-ads/index.html. 
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threatened to deploy the military in Minneapolis to “bring the City under control” and 
infamously stated “when the looting starts, the shooting starts.”187  
 
 
President Trump made this post across several platforms. While Twitter appended a notice 
to the President’s post explaining that the post violated the platform’s rules against 
glorifying violence and requiring users to click through the notice to view the tweet (see 
below),  
 
 
 
187 Megan Rose Dickey and Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook Employees Stage Virtual 
Walkout in Protest of Company’s Stance on Trump Posts, TECHCRUNCH (June 1, 2020), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/01/facebook-employees-stage-virtual-walkout-in-protest-
of-companys-stance-on-trump-posts/ (screenshot included). 
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Facebook took no action.188 Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained that he was 
personally appalled by the President’s tweet, but felt that Facebook’s institutional role was 
to “enable as much expression as possible unless it will cause imminent risk of specific 
harms or dangers spelled out in [Facebook’s] clear policies.” Zuckerberg explained further 
that “we read it as a warning about state action, and we think people need to know if the 
government is planning to deploy force.”189 Some of Facebook’s employees, however, 
were extremely dissatisfied by the company’s response, resulting in “intense debate” on 
Facebook’s internal employee messaging system about the company’s laissez-faire 
policies regarding politicians’ posts.190 In response, Zuckerberg hosted an internal town-
hall to explain his and the company’s rationale for inaction.191 Facebook ultimately 
retreated from its non-interventionist stance towards Donald Trump and his campaign, at 
least with respect to its hate speech content regulation, as it removed a Trump Campaign 
page ad because of its use of a symbol of hate.192 However, many companies felt Facebook 
 
188 Brian Stelter and Donie O’Sullivan, Trump Tweets Threat That ‘Looting’ Will Lead to 
‘Shooting.’ Twitter Put a Warning Label on It, CNN (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/tech/trump-twitter-minneapolis/index.html. 
189 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (May 29, 2020, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10111961824369871. 
190 Rachel Siegel and Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Employees Blast Zuckerberg’s 
Hands-Off Response to Trump Posts as Protests Grip Nation, WASH. POST (June 1, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/01/facebook-zuckerberg-
donation-trump/. 
191 Elizabeth Dwoskin and Nitasha Tiku, Facebook Employees Said They Were ‘Caught 
in an Abusive Relationship’ with Trump as Internal Debates Raged, WASH. POST (June 5, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/05/facebook-zuckerberg-
trump/. 
192 Days later when a Trump-affiliated campaign page posted an advertisement 
denouncing “dangerous MOBS of far-left groups … causing absolute mayhem” 
accompanied by an image of a downward facing red triangle, Facebook deactivated those 
ads because the image was the same symbol used by the Nazis to denote political 
prisoners in its concentration camps. Facebook representatives stated that the ad violated 
a policy against using a “banned hate group’s symbols” outside of a condemnatory 
context or as an object for discussion. Isaac Stanley-Becker, Facebook Removes Trump 
Ads with Symbol Once Used by Nazis to Designate Political Prisoners, WASH. POST 
(June 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/18/trump-campaign-
runs-ads-with-marking-once-used-by-nazis-designate-political-prisoners/.  Zuckerberg 
has also since announced that Facebook will begin labeling “newsworthy content.” 
Occasionally, he explains, “we leave up content that would otherwise violate our policies 
if the public interest value outweighs the risk of harm.” Now, Facebook will append a 
notification that the content violates Facebook’s policy but remains so that people can 
engage with and discuss it. Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (June 26, 2020, 11:25 AM), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10112048980882521. Facebook will also further 
restrict content that can be included in paid advertisements. Ads that claim people from 
“a specific race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, 
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still had not gone far enough, and joined a growing advertising boycott to pressure the 
platform to take more aggressive action against the hate speech and misinformation being 
spread by political figures such as President Trump.193 Facebook responded by announcing 
that it would remove posts from political leaders that incited violence or attempted to 
suppress voting, and affix labels on posts violating its hate speech prohibitions.194  
 
Facebook’s decision to exempt speech by politicians from its fact-checking and 
other content regulation policies also drew sharp criticism recently from civil rights 
experts, who conducted an extensive, independent two-year civil rights audit of Facebook’s 
content regulation policies and their implementation.195 The experts’ concerns were 
magnified by Facebook’s response to President Trump’s posts regarding recent civil rights 
protests and mail-in ballots in the context of the pandemic. The civil rights experts 
expressed strong criticisms of the company’s policies and exemption of Trump’s posts 
from its content regulation policies and voiced particular concern about the ramifications 
of this exemption for our political process: 
 
We have grave concerns that the combination of the company’s decision to 
exempt politicians from fact-checking and the precedents set by its recent 
 
gender identity or immigration status are a threat to the physical safety, health or survival 
of others” are now prohibited when they were not before, and Facebook also intends to 
“better protect immigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from ads suggesting 
these groups are inferior or expressing contempt, dismissal or disgust directed at them.” 
Id. 
193 “Marketers are expressing unease with how [Facebook] handles misinformation and 
hate speech, including its permissive approach to problematic posts by President Trump.“ 
All the Companies Quitting Facebook, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK NEWSLETTER (July 7, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/business/dealbook/facebook-boycott-
ads.html. Boycott lists can be found here: Tiffany Hsu and Gillian Friedman, CVS, 
Dunkin’, Lego: The Brands Pulling Ads from Facebook over Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7. 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/business/media/Facebook-
advertising-boycott.html; and here: Allen Kim and Brian Fung, Facebook Boycott: View 
the List of Companies Pulling Ads, CNN (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/28/business/facebook-ad-boycott-list/index.html. 
194 Craig Timberg and Elizabeth Dwoskin, Silicon Valley is Getting Tougher on Trump 
and His Supporters over Hate Speech and Disinformation, Wash. Post (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/10/hate-speech-trump-tech/. 
Twitch recently suspended President Trump’s account and Reddit closed a long-
controversial forum named after the President (this same forum helped to popularize the 
dangerous Pizzagate false conspiracy theory). Reddit’s action may have been in response 
to “employee” concerns as well, as it came after an open letter written by hundreds of 
volunteer moderators chastised Reddit’s leadership for the proliferation of hateful speech, 
calling it the company’s “most glaring problem.” Id. 
195 See Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit – Final Report (July 8, 2020), available here: 
https://muslimadvocates.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Civil-Rights-Audit-Final-
Report.pdf. 
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decisions on President Trump’s posts, leaves the door open for the platform 
to be used by other politicians to interfere with voting. If politicians are free 
to mislead people about official voting methods (by labeling ballots illegal 
or making other misleading statements that go unchecked, for example) and 
are allowed to use not-so-subtle dog whistles with impunity to incite 
violence against groups advocating for racial justice, this does not bode well 
for the hostile voting environment that can be facilitated by Facebook in the 
United States. We are concerned that politicians, and any other user for that 
matter, will capitalize on the policy gaps made apparent by the president’s 
posts and target particular communities to suppress the votes of groups 
based on their race or other characteristics. With only months left before a 
major election, this is deeply troublesome as misinformation, sowing racial 
division and calls for violence near elections can do great damage to our 
democracy.196 
 
Facebook’s Refusal to Regulate the Microtargeting of Political Ads 
 
 Facebook, as discussed above, has been the primary social media platform 
facilitating the microtargeting of political ads to members of the public, allowing political 
advertisers to have access to the vast trove of social data that it collects on its users, to serve 
up ads to users with great precision and with no public scrutiny.  In addition to Facebook’s 
reticence to adopt measures applicable to false political ads by politicians, the company 
has also been flatly unwilling to regulate or modify its practice of allowing for the 
microtargeting of political ads on its platform, despite calls for the company to do so. 
Although Facebook as of late 2019 was reportedly considering increasing the minimum 
number of people who can be targeted in political ads on its platform from 100 to a few 
thousand, as of this date, Facebook has not made any changes to its policy allowing for the 
microtargeting of political ads.197  
Facebook's Transparency and Disclosure Requirements Regarding Political/Electioneering 
Advertisements 
 
196 Id. 
197 See Associated Press, Facebook Refuses to Restrict Untruthful Political Ads and 
Micro-Targeting, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/09/facebook-political-ads-micro-
targeting-us-election; Emily Glazer, Facebook Weighs Steps to Curb Narrowly Targeted 
Political Ads, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-
discussing-potential-changes-to-political-ad-policy-11574352887?mod=followfacebook. 
The company has, however, adopted a policy that will allow users to opt out of political 
ads. https://thehill.com/policy/technology/477486-facebook-will-still-allow-
misinformation-micro-targeting-under-new-ad-rules  
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Facebook has recently implemented a Political Advertising Policy that requires, 
first, that every election-related and issue advertisement made available on Facebook to 
users in the United States be clearly labeled as a “Political Ad” and include a “Paid for by” 
disclosure, with the name of the individual or organization who paid for the advertisement 
at the top of the advertisement.198  Second, under the Policy, Facebook has committed to 
collecting and maintaining a publicly available archive of political advertisements as part 
of its Ad Library, which provides information regarding the campaign budget associated 
with each individual ad and how many people saw it, including their age, location, and 
gender.199 See example below.  
 
 
 
And Facebook has recently updated its Ad Library’s functionality in an effort to increase 
transparency and provide more useful data to researchers, advocates, and the public 
generally – including by permitting users to search for and filter ads based on the estimated 
audience size – which enable researchers to identify and study micro-targeted ads.200 
Finally, under the Policy, Facebook will prohibit foreign entities from purchasing political 
ads directed at U.S. audiences.  Facebook implements this last prohibition by mailing to 
prospective political advertisers a postcard to a U.S. address in order to verify U.S. 
residency.  If a prospective purchaser of a political ad is not verified under this process, it 
will not be able to purchase a political ad on Facebook.  Commenting on the recently 
 
198 See Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More Transparent, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-ads-and-pages/. 
199 Since 2018, Facebook has maintained a library of ads about social issues, elections or 
politics that ran on the platform. These ads are either classified as being about social 
issues, elections or politics or the advertisers self-declare that the ads require a “Paid for 
by” disclaimer.  See, e.g., Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit – Final Report, July 8, 2020; 
Rob Leathern, Shining a Light on Ads with Political Content, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(May 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-political-content/. 
200 See Facebook’s Civil Rights Audit – Final Report, July 8, 2020. 
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implemented Political Advertising Policy, Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained, 
“These changes won’t fix everything, but they will make it a lot harder for anyone to do 
what the Russians did during the 2016 election and use fake accounts and pages to run 
ads.”201 Facebook’s recently implemented measures imposing disclosure requirements on 
political ads and limiting foreign entities from purchasing political ads go beyond those 
that are encompassed in the proposed Honest Ads Act, discussed above, and may at least 
be moderately successful in preventing the type of foreign interference in U.S. elections 
that occurred in 2016. 
 
Google’s Measures to Address Microtargeting of Political Ads 
 
 Google recently amended its rules governing the practice of microtargeting of 
political advertisements. While Google maintains that it has never offered “granular 
microtargeting” of election ads, in November 2019, Google officially amended its rules to 
restrict microtargeting so that political advertisers can only target ads based on three 
characteristics: an individual’s age, gender, and general location (defined by postal 
code).202 Political advertisers can also use contextual targeting, which enables them to 
serve users with ads according to the content that users are accessing.203 Google claims this 
approach aligns it with industry practice in television, radio and print media.204 Google’s 
policy on microtargeting took effect in the European Union at the end of 2019, and became 
effective worldwide (including in the United States) in January 2020.205 
 
201 Josh Constine, Facebook and Instagram Launch US Political Ad Labeling and 
Archive, TECHCRUNCH (May 24, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/24/facebook-
political-ad-archive/. 
202 Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE BLOG: THE KEYWORD 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-ads-policy/.  
203 See id. Regarding its newly-announced policy, Google explains: 
In the U.S., we have offered basic political targeting capabilities to verified advertisers, 
such as serving ads based on public voter records and general political affiliations (left-
leaning, right-leaning, and independent).  While we've never offered granular 
microtargeting of election ads, we believe there’s more we can do to further promote 
increased visibility of election ads. That’s why we’re limiting election ads audience 
targeting to the following general categories: age, gender, and general location (postal 
code level). Political advertisers can . . . continue to do contextual targeting, such as 
serving ads to people reading or watching a story about, say, the economy. Of course, we 
recognize that robust political dialogue is an important part of democracy, and no one can 
sensibly adjudicate every political claim, counterclaim, and insinuation. So we expect 
that the number of political ads on which we take action will be very limited—but we 
will continue to do so for clear violations. Id. 
204 Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE BLOG: THE KEYWORD 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-ads-policy/. 
205 Rachel Sandler, Google Limits Microtargeting for Paid Political Ads, Forbes (Nov. 
20, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2019/11/20/google-limits-
microtargeting-for-paid-political-ads/#55c667fd51ec. 
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Accordingly, under Google’s rules, only the following characteristics may be used 
to target election ads: geographic location (but not radius around a location), age, gender, 
and contextual targeting options such as ad placements, topics, keywords against sites, 
apps, pages and videos. All other types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads, 
including the use of Google’s powerful Audience Targeting products,206 Remarketing,207 
Customer Match,208 and Geographic Radius Targeting.209     Google’s microtargeting 
policy applies to ads shown to users of Google’s search engine and YouTube, as well as 
display advertisements sold by Google that appear on other websites. In an email to 
political campaigns, Google outlined these new rules, explaining that election ads will no 
longer be allowed to target what are called “affinity audiences” that look like other groups 
that campaigns might want to target. Further, political campaigns can no longer upload 
their own lists of people to whom to show ads. In addition, Google will prohibit what is 
known as “remarketing,” the process of serving ads to people who have previously taken 
an action like visiting a campaign’s website. 
Google’s microtargeting policy prevents political advertisers from taking 
advantage of some of Google’s most sophisticated targeting tools, upon which it has built 
its dominant market position.210 The most granular of those targeting tools are “custom 
affinity” audiences, an offering that has allowed advertisers to create tailor-made audiences 
by targeting individual interests and lifestyles as defined by keyword phrases. Google’s 
sophisticated targeting tools also have allowed advertisers to target or exclude according 
to demographic data such as age, gender, household income, homeownership, and the 
like.211 General advertisers may also target users who have previously interacted with their 
 
206 About Audience Targeting, GOOGLE ADS HELP, https://support.google.com/google-
ads/answer/2497941 (last accessed: July 21, 2020). 
207 About Remarketing, GOOGLE ADS HELP, https://support.google.com/google-
ads/answer/2453998 (last accessed: July 21, 2020). 
208 About Customer Match, GOOGLE ADS HELP, https://support.google.com/google-
ads/answer/6379332 (last accessed: July 21, 2020). 
209 Target Ads to Geographic Locations, GOOGLE ADS HELP, 
https://support.google.com/google-ads/answer/1722043 (last accessed: July 21, 2020). 
210 According to this WSJ report citing “research firm eMarketer”: 37% of the $130 
billion U.S. digital ad market. Patience Haggin and Kara Dapena, Google’s Ad 
Dominance Explained in Three Charts, WALL STREET J. (June 17, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-googles-advertising-dominance-is-drawing-antitrust-
scrutiny-11560763800.  
211 About Demographic Targeting, GOOGLE ADS HELP, 
https://support.google.com/google-ads/answer/2580383?hl=en&ref_topic=3122881 (last 
accessed July 21, 2020). 
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site212 or by submitting previously collected customer data to re-engage with the same 
group or expand to similar audiences.213 These sophisticated targeting tools are now 
unavailable to political advertisers.  
 
One of the greatest challenges Google faces in implementing its policy restricting 
the use of microtargeting by political advertisers is how to meaningfully and accurately 
define political/election advertising. With respect to the United States, Google currently 
defines election ads as those that feature: 
● A current officeholder or candidate for an elected federal office (including federal 
offices such as that of the President or Vice President of the United States, members 
of the United States House of Representatives or United States Senate). 
● A current officeholder or candidate for a state-level elected office, such as 
Governor, Secretary of State, or member of a state legislature. 
● A federal or state level political party. 
● A state-level ballot measure, initiative, or proposition that has qualified for the 
ballot in its state.214 
 
Yet, few election ads as they are popularly understood are likely to be so specific. For 
example, “issue ads” funded by Super-PACs may not specifically “advocate the election 
or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate,”215 yet such outside spending makes up 
the vast majority of political advertising.216  Thus, Google’s definition of election ads may 
turn out to be substantially underinclusive and ineffective.  
Google has also implemented a host of procedural requirements for political 
advertisers.  Advertisers who wish to purchase and run election ads217 or use political 
 
212 Reach People Who Visited Your Site Or App, GOOGLE ADS HELP, 
https://support.google.com/google-ads/topic/3122874?hl=en&ref_topic=3121935 (last 
accessed July 21, 2020). 
213 About Customer Match, GOOGLE ADS HELP, https://support.google.com/google-
ads/answer/6379332?hl=en&ref_topic=6296507 (last accessed July 21, 2020). 
214 “Disclosure Requirements for Election Advertising”, Political Content, GOOGLE 
ADVERT. POLICIES HELP, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595#701 (last 
accessed July 21, 2020). 
215 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ADVERT. AND DISCLAIMERS, 
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/advertising/ 
(last accessed Jul. 19, 2020). 
216 2020 Outside Spending, by Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=R (last visited June 21, 
2020). 
217 “Election Ads”, Political Content, GOOGLE ADVERT. POLICIES HELP, 
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595 (last accessed July 21, 2020). 
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affiliation in personalized advertising218 in the United States must go through a verification 
process, which is required for all ad formats/extensions, and all personalized ads features. 
Political advertisers must provide a Federal Election Commission (FEC) ID and either an 
Employer Identification Number (EIN) (for organizations) or Social Security Number (for 
individuals). Google collects such data and makes available a transparency report on 
political ad spending by each advertiser/campaign. The transparency report lists top 
advertisers and the amount of political ad spending by each advertiser.  A recent 
transparency report (as of June 6, 2020) provides this list of top political ad spending since 
May 31, 2018:219 
 
Google’s Regulation of Falsity and Misleading Content in Political Ads 
Google also recently revised its rules about truth in advertising to prohibit ads with 
“demonstrably false claims that could significantly undermine participation or trust” in 
elections.220 Google has stated, however, that by reframing these truth-in-advertising rules, 
 
218 “Political Affiliation in Personalized Advertising”, Political Content, GOOGLE 
ADVERT. POLICIES HELP, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/143465?#533 (last 
accessed July 21, 2020). 
219 Political Advertising in the United States, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/region/US?hl=en (last accessed July 
6, 2020). 
220 Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE BLOG: THE KEYWORD 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-ads-
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it does not intend to appoint itself as the arbiter of truth in politics. Google explains that 
since “no one can sensibly adjudicate every political claim, counterclaim, and insinuation,” 
it will focus its efforts on claims that are something more than generic falsehood or 
exaggeration. It will not take comprehensive action against every misleading political ad 
but will do so for “clear violations.” That line will likely be difficult to define and maintain. 
In its announcement, Google gives the example of “deep fakes” as the type of content that 
it will now remove. These are addressed by Google’s policy prohibiting “manipulating 
media to deceive, defraud, or mislead others.” The example the company provides is 
“deceptively doctoring media related to politics, social issues, or matters of public 
concern.”221 Google has also released an open-source database containing 3,000 
manipulated videos in order to help identify and target deepfakes.222   
It is as yet unclear what falls within the category of demonstrably false political ads 
according to Google,223 but a few examples provide some guidance.  When YouTube CEO 
Susan Wojcicki was asked whether YouTube would remove President Trump’s 
advertisement (which he placed on Facebook) falsely accusing Joe Biden of corruptly 
sheltering his son from a Ukrainian investigation through bribery, Wojcicki explained that 
this ad “would not be a violation of our policies” because “politicians are always accusing 
their opponents of lying.”224 On the other hand, Wojcicki cited the (now infamous) video 
that showed Nancy Pelosi speaking at an artificially reduced rate, which made Pelosi 
 
policy/; Misrepresentation, GOOGLE ADVERT. POLICIES HELP, 
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6020955?hl=en (last accessed July 21, 
2020). 
221 Misrepresentation, GOOGLE ADVERT. POLICIES HELP, 
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6020955?hl=en (last accessed July 21, 
2020). 
222 Karen Hao, Google Has Released a Giant Database of Deepfakes to Help Fight 
Deepfakes, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614426/google-has-released-a-giant-database-of-
deepfakes-to-help-fight-deepfakes/; see also Nick Dufour and Andrew Gully, 
Contributing Data to Deepfake Detection Research, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://ai.googleblog.com/2019/09/contributing-data-to-deepfake-detection.html. 
223 Google and YouTube have removed over 300 Trump ads in the last half of 2019, but 
the archive in which removed ads are listed does not indicate why specific ads were 
removed.  Shachar Bar-On & Natalie Jimenez Peel, 300+ Trump Ads Taken Down by 
Google, YouTube, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES OVERTIME (Dec. 1, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/300-trump-ads-taken-down-by-google-youtube-60-
minutes-2019-12-01/.  
224 Lesley Stahl, How Does YouTube Handle the Site’s Misinformation, Conspiracy 
Theories, and Hate?, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Dec. 1, 2019), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-youtube-doing-enough-to-fight-hate-speech-and-
conspiracy-theories-60-minutes-2019-12-01/.  
 
61 
 
appear to be drunk. Wojcicki noted that that video was removed “very fast” because “it’s 
not okay to have technically manipulated content that would be misleading.”225  
 
With respect to manipulated media in particular, YouTube has adopted specifically 
applicable policies.226 Its deceptive practices policies state that “[C]ontent that has been 
technically manipulated or doctored in a way that misleads users (beyond clips taken out 
of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm” are prohibited and will be 
removed from YouTube.227  YouTube has further stated that it will remove content that 
attempts to mislead people about the voting process or any other false information relating 
to elections.228 YouTube also recently created an Intelligence Desk to help review 
technically-manipulated content and take proactive approaches to mitigate the spread of 
such  content,229 and the company has also changed its recommendations systems to 
prevent people from viewing misinformation on its site.230   
 
III. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF PLATFORMS’ MEASURES TO COMBAT MEDICAL AND 
POLITICAL MISINFORMATION  
 
The efforts undertaken by the major social media platforms’ measures to address 
medical and political misinformation are not without their problems. These efforts, 
however, are generally consistent with First Amendment substantive and procedural 
values, are trending in the right direction, and are by and large welcomed by the American 
public.  The platforms’ efforts are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny, since the 
platforms are not state actors.231 On the contrary, the platforms enjoy great discretion with 
respect to the choices they make regarding content regulation on their platforms, thanks to 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (at least for now).232 That said, the 
 
225 Id. 
226 How YouTube Supports Elections, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2020/02/how-youtube-supports-elections.html. 
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
229 Id.  
230 Id.  
231 See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the 
Internet Age (2009). 
232 The Communications Decency Act Section 230 prohibits any attempt to hold social 
media platforms liable for hosting harmful speech or for taking steps to remove harmful 
speech. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2019). Section 230(c)(1) of the Act provides that “No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Courts 
have consistently interpreted this provision to immunize social media platforms from 
liability for hosting a variety of categories of harmful speech, including causes of action 
such as defamation, negligence, gross negligence, nuisance, sending threatening 
messages, and even statutory violations of the Fair Housing Act and related anti-
discrimination violations. In addition, the “good Samaritan” provision of Section 230 
immunizes platforms from liability for undertaking measures to screen or block content 
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measures that the platforms have undertaken to combat misinformation have been largely 
consistent with First Amendment substantive and procedural values.   
 
First, the platforms’ most interventionist efforts with respect to false medical 
misinformation and false/misleading statements of fact in the health and medical context  
are consistent with First Amendment substantive values, in which lesser protection is 
accorded for false and misleading statements of fact (especially in the medical field). While 
the marketplace of ideas theory (and its default response of counterspeech as a remedy for 
bad speech) accords broad protection to good and bad ideas, it does not accord the same 
broad protections to good and bad claims or assertions of fact.  The Supreme Court in 
embracing the marketplace of ideas theory has made clear that there is no such thing as a 
false idea—that all ideas are protected—but that false statements of fact are not similarly 
immune from regulation.  While the Court has sometimes recognized the minimal potential 
contributions to the marketplace of ideas made by harmless lies
233
 or some false statements 
 
on their platforms, providing that platforms cannot “be held liable on account of . . . any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene . . . excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). President Trump has recently 
taken aim at Section 230. See  
 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-
censorship/ 
 
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/499871-trump-to-order-review-of-law-protecting-
social-media-from-responsibility  
 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200714/23061044903/house-government-
appropriations-bill-would-bar-ftc-fcc-doing-anything-related-to-trumps-inane-anti-230-
executive-order.shtml  
 
233 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 732 (2012). In United States v. Alvarez, 
567 U.S. 709 (2012), the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, struck down a portion of the 
Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalized the making of false statements about 
having a military medal.  The Act made it a misdemeanor to falsely represent oneself as 
having received any U.S. military decoration or medal and provided for prison terms up 
to six months (and up to one year if the subject of such lies was the Medal of Honor).  In 
a challenge brought by Xavier Alvarez, who was convicted under the Act for publicly 
lying about receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor, the Court struck down the 
Stolen Valor Act on First Amendment grounds. Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality, 
held that harmless false statements are not, by the sole reason of their falsity, excluded 
from First Amendment protection. See also Breyer, J., concurring in judgment, arguing 
that when Alvarez posed as a military medal recipient, this was a seemingly harmless lie, 
since this did not hurt anyone and was a lie that could be easily remedies by 
counterspeech – i.e., if a list of medal recipients were made available on the Internet. 
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of fact,
234
 it has also emphasized that the First Amendment does not stand in the way of 
regulating intentionally false or misleading harmful assertions of fact,
235
 especially in the 
medical context. Indeed, with regard to false and misleading statements of fact regarding 
medical treatments, cures, medicine, etc., the Food and Drug Administration and the 
Federal Trade Commission have extensive authority, consistent with the First Amendment, 
to prohibit false and misleading claims. The FDA and the FTC are empowered to prohibit 
the false or misleading branding, advertising, marketing, and/or sale of products – 
including products that claim to be cures or treatments for COVID-19 – and these agencies 
have recently cracked down on online purveyors of such products.236  Thus, it is not 
inconsistent with First Amendment values for the social media platforms to undertake 
 
234 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
235 See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974): "[T]here is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially 
advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public 
issues." (citations omitted).  
236The FDA has authority to regulate purveyors of such products on the grounds that they 
“misleadingly” represent that their products as safe and effective for the treatment or 
prevention of COVID-19, and that the products are therefore illegal unapproved and 
misbranded products under Section 502 of the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act (the “FD&C 
Act”).  See Alexandra Sternlicht, The FTC Has Sent Cease-And-Desist Letters to Over 
150 Companies Who Claim to Have COVID-19 Cures, FORBES (July 9, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/07/09/the-ftc-has-sent-cease-and-
desist-letters-to-over-150-companies-who-claim-to-have-COVID-19-
cures/#34ef5282722e (FDA has sent warning letters to over 150 companies who claim to 
have COVID-19 cures); Meagan Flynn, Leader of Fake Church Peddling Bleach as 
COVID-19 Cure Sought Trump’s Support. Instead, He Got Federal Charges., WASH. 
POST (July 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/09/fake-
coronavirus-cure-bleach/ (criminal charges for conspiracy to defraud the United States 
and deliver misbranded drugs brought against fake Florida church that claims to have 
COVID-19 cures). The FDA has authority to regulate purveyors of such products on the 
grounds that they “misleadingly” represent that their products as safe and effective for the 
treatment or prevention of COVID-19, and that the products are therefore illegal 
unapproved and misbranded products under Section 502 of the Food Drug & Cosmetic 
Act (the “FD&C Act”). In addition, by marketing products as intended to mitigate, 
prevent, treat, diagnose or cure COVID-19 in people, the products were deemed “drugs” 
as defined under the FD&C Act, see 21 USC § 321(g)(1), and – absent advance review 
and approval by the FDA – these products were deemed “unapproved new drugs” sold in 
violation of Section 505(a), 301(a) and (d) of the FD&C Act. In addition, under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., it is unlawful to 
advertise that a product can prevent, treat, or cure human disease unless the purveyor 
possesses competent and reliable scientific evidence (including, for example, well-
controlled human clinical studies) substantiating that the claims are true at the time they 
are made. Accordingly, to make or exaggerate such claims without scientific evidence 
sufficient to substantiate them violates the FTC Act.  
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measures to combat false and misleading statements of fact, especially in the area of 
medical and health related information.237 
 
In addition, the platforms’ efforts to remove content likely to incite violence or 
great public harm is consistent with the emergency exception in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, as originally articulated by Holmes and Brandeis
238
 and as recognized by 
the Court in its incitement jurisprudence in Brandenburg v. Ohio and progeny.  Content 
that is created or shared with the purpose of immediately contributing to or exacerbating 
violence or physical harm is generally subject to regulation under the First Amendment’s 
incitement jurisprudence, under which the government is permitted to regulate “advocacy 
of … law violation . . . where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
239
  
 
Further, the platforms’ efforts to label less harmful false and misleading medical 
information and to develop and refer users to accurate information revolves primarily 
around providing counterspeech instead of implementing censorship as a remedy.  This is 
consistent with First Amendment substantive values and with the marketplace of ideas 
theory of the First Amendment, according to which – ever since the formative years of 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence – the accepted response to bad speech is not 
censorship but more (better) speech.
 240
 As Justice Brandeis explained in his oft-quoted 
concurrence in Whitney v. California, joined by Justice Holmes: “If there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies [of speech], to avert the evil by the process 
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”
241
 According 
to the marketplace theory of the First Amendment, ideas should generally be allowed to 
compete freely in the marketplace unfettered by government restrictions (absent 
emergency conditions).  The default remedy for harmful ideas in the marketplace of speech 
is not censorship, but counterspeech, which operates by allowing those who are exposed to 
bad speech to be exposed to good speech as a counterweight. The platforms’ efforts to 
respond to false and misleading medical and political information by labeling them as such 
and to refer users to accurate information is consistent with this counterspeech approach in 
First Amendment jurisprudence. In addition, the platforms’ efforts in regulating 
misinformation in political speech and political advertising contribute toward “producing 
an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs” and facilitating the preconditions 
necessary for citizens to engage in the task of democratic self-government,
242
 which are 
also foundational goals of our First Amendment jurisprudence. 
  
 
237 Id. 
238 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
239 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
240Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.  As Holmes explained in his Abrams dissent, “[o]nly the 
emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels 
to time warrants making an exception to the sweeping command, ‘Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.’”  Id. at 630–31. 
241Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
242 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 392. 
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The platforms’ efforts are also generally consistent with First Amendment 
procedural values and with principles of due process generally.243 The First Amendment’s 
protections for freedom of expression not only embody a substantive dimension of which 
categories of speech to protect; they also embody procedural dimensions, imported from 
the Due Process Clause, which require that “sensitive tools” be implemented by 
decisionmakers in restricting speech.244  As free speech theorist Henry Monaghan explains, 
“procedural guarantees play an equally large role in protecting freedom of speech; indeed, 
they assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be 
applied.”245  Accordingly, First Amendment jurisprudence incorporates a powerful “body 
of procedural law which defines the manner in which [decisionmakers] must evaluate and 
resolve [free speech] claims — [establishing] a First Amendment due process.”246 This 
jurisprudence embodies “a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards designed to 
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.”247 Consistent with these procedural safeguards 
embodied in First Amendment jurisprudence, social media platforms should impose speech 
restrictions on medical and political misinformation in a clear, neutral, and transparent 
manner, such that speakers are adequately and clearly informed of the platforms’ rules 
regarding speech, speakers are specifically informed of the reasons why their speech was 
restricted (removed or labeled), such decisions are made consistently by impartial 
decisionmakers, and speakers have an opportunity to be heard/to appeal any such speech 
restrictions.  In general, the platforms have provided clear notice to users of their (evolving) 
terms of service regarding medical and political misinformation and have provided users 
with clear notice when implementing speech removal or labeling decisions. For example, 
as discussed above, when Twitter restricted Donald Trump, Jr.’s posts embodying false 
claims about and unproven cures for COVID-19 on the grounds that the post violated 
Twitter’s rules regarding medical misinformation,248 it did so in the context of providing 
clear prior notice of what speech was restricted and a process to appeal Twitter’s 
decisions,249 and it also provided notice to Trump, Jr., of the specific reason why his speech 
was restricted.  See below. 
 
243 See, e.g., Dawn Carla Nunziato, How (Not) To Censor: Procedural First Amendment 
Values and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1123 (2014); Dawn Carla 
Nunziato, Forget About It? Harmonizing European and American Protections for 
Privacy, Free Speech, and Due Process, Privacy and Power (Cambridge University Press 
2017). 
244 Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963). 
245 Henry Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
248 See text accompanying notes x – y. 
249 See https://help.twitter.com/forms/general?subtopic=suspended (setting forth the 
procedural for users to appeal severe violations of Twitter’s rules resulting in suspending 
and/or blocked accounts). 
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In short, the extensive measures undertaken by the major social media platforms to respond 
to false and misleading misinformation in the medical and political contexts are generally 
consistent with our First Amendment substantive and procedural values.  
 
In addition, recent studies have shown that the efforts undertaken by the major 
social media platforms’ measures to address political and medical misinformation have 
been moderately successful. As Hunt Allcott and his co-authors report in their article 
Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media, based on their study of “trends 
in the diffusion of content from 570 fake news websites and 10,240 fake news stories on 
Facebook and Twitter between January 2015 and July 2018,” while “[u]ser interactions 
with false content rose steadily on . . . Facebook . . . through the end of 2016,” since then, 
“interactions with false content have fallen sharply.”
250
  The authors of the study find that 
“user interaction with known false news sites has declined by 50 percent since the 2016 
election.“
251
  Based on these findings, the authors conclude that “efforts by Facebook 
following the 2016 election to limit the diffusion of misinformation [namely, the “suite of 
policy and algorithmic changes made by Facebook following the 2016 election”252] may 
have had a meaningful impact.”
253
  
 
 
250Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow & Chuan Yu, Trends in the Diffusion of 
Misinformation on Social Media 1 (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 18-029, 2018), https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fake-
news-trends.pdf. 
251Allcott, Gentzkow & Yu, supra note x, at 5.  
252 Id. at 6. 
253 Id. at 3. 
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Further, the labeling of content as false or misleading on social media platforms has 
been shown to be effective in limiting the dissemination of such false or misleading 
content. According to a recent study, social media users were about 50% less likely to share 
false stories if the stories had been labeled as false. With no labels being used at all, 
participants considered sharing 29.8 percent of false stories in the sample, but that figure 
dropped to 16.1 percent of false stories that had a label attached.254 In addition, the labeling 
of posts as false led to improved accuracy in social media users’ beliefs. Researchers found, 
in an exhaustive series of surveys across more than 10,000 participants on a wide range of 
topics, that 60% of respondents gave accurate answers when presented with a fact-
check/correction, while only 32% expressed accurate beliefs when they were not presented 
with a fact-check/correction.255  
 
Finally, there is broad public support among Americans for social media platforms’ 
continuing to take a meaningful role in combating political and medical misinformation on 
their platforms. A March 2020 Knight Foundation/Gallup Poll found that the vast majority 
of Americans surveyed (81%) supported the removal of intentionally misleading 
information on elections or other political issues, and an even greater majority of 
Americans surveyed (85%) supported social media companies’ removal of intentionally 
misleading health information.256   
 
 
254 See Peter Dizikes, The Catch to Putting Warning Labels on Fake News, MIT NEWS 
(Mar. 2, 2020), http://news.mit.edu/2020/warning-labels-fake-news-trustworthy-0303. 
255 Lee Drutman, Fact-Checking Misinformation Can Work. But It Might Not Be 
Enough., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 4, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-
twitters-fact-check-of-trump-might-not-be-enough-to-combat-misinformation. The 
political scientists conducting the surveys, Ethan Porter and Thomas J. Wood, found that 
the most effective fact-checks shared four characteristics: they were from a highly 
credible source, they offered a new frame for the issue rather than merely calling the 
misinformation “wrong,” they didn’t directly challenge a worldview or identity, and they 
happened before a false narrative could gain traction. Id. 
256 Free Expression, Harmful Speech and Censorship in a Digital World, Knight 
Foundation and Gallup (2020), https://knightfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/KnightFoundation_Panel6-Techlash2_rprt_061220-v2_es-1.pdf. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Social media platforms are playing an ever-expanding role in shaping the contours of 
information ecosystem today, as these platforms have shouldered the burden of ensuring 
that the public is informed – and not misinformed – about matters affecting our democratic 
institutions in the context of our elections, as well as about matters affecting our very health 
and lives in the context of the pandemic.  The platforms are attempting to address these 
serious problems alone, in the absence of federal or state regulation or guidance in the 
United States.  While the platforms’ intervention in the online marketplace of ideas is not 
without its problems, this Article has argued that this intervention is by and large a salutary 
development and is one that has brought about improvements in the online information 
ecosystem. Social media companies have been generally inspired by First Amendment free 
speech values – both substantive and procedural – to protect a vibrant marketplace of ideas 
online while imposing limited, moderately effective checks on harmful false and 
misleading speech, with complex systems of removal, fact-checking, and labeling, and by 
serving up prominent information from independent fact-checkers and trusted authorities 
to counter medical and political misinformation.  In the absence of effective regulatory 
measures in the United States to combat medical and political misinformation online, social 
media companies should be commended for their efforts thus far and should continue to 
develop and deploy even more successful measures to combat such misinformation online.  
 
 
